



When trade and foreign policy collide: Indonesia in Doha development round

Moch Faisal Karim

To cite this article: Moch Faisal Karim (2020): When trade and foreign policy collide: Indonesia in Doha development round, The Pacific Review, DOI: [10.1080/09512748.2020.1724189](https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2020.1724189)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2020.1724189>



Published online: 10 Feb 2020.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



When trade and foreign policy collide: Indonesia in Doha development round

Moch Faisal Karim 

Faculty of Humanities, Department of International Relations, Bina Nusantara University, Jakarta, Indonesia


ABSTRACT

This article examines Indonesia's conflicting roles in global trade governance, particularly in the Doha Development Round. This article argues that multilateral trade governance is utilised by Indonesian foreign policymakers to be the arena for Indonesia's aspiration to exercise a greater role at the global level. This aspiration is reflected in its support towards liberalisation agenda at the global level. However, the commitments made, as well as the rhetoric calling for a more liberalised multilateral trading system within the Round, are not in line with Indonesia's protectionist-leaning domestic trade policies. This condition, arguably, is the result of the co-optation of trade policy in Doha Round by the Indonesian foreign policy agenda. While the Ministry of Trade has full authority to formulate trade negotiation position, Indonesia's aspiration for international status pursued by foreign policymakers has significantly influenced its trade policy agenda in the Doha Round. Thus, Indonesia's behaviour in the Doha Round can only be interpreted as role-playing in which Indonesia 'play the role' to enhance its international status rather than based its position on coherent domestic economic interest.

KEYWORDS Doha Development Round; foreign policy; Indonesia; trade policy; WTO

Introduction

Recently, there has been a proliferation of studies examining the roles of emerging powers in global governance (Hameiri & Zeng, 2019; Kahler, 2013; Wade, 2011). The case of emerging powers' role in global trade governance through the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the most obvious example where imbalances in the western-led global system have been challenged by voices from the global south (Hopewell, 2017; Stephen & Parížek, 2019). Most studies focusing on the role of emerging powers from the global south mainly frame emerging powers as forces that challenge

CONTACT Moch Faisal Karim  mkarim@binus.edu  Faculty of Humanities, Department of International, Bina Nusantara University, Jakarta 11480, Indonesia.

© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

Western-led liberal order (Hopewell, 2015; Hurrell & Narlikar, 2006; Narlikar, 2006). They argue that emerging powers more likely seek to challenge the Western-dominated institutions of global governance and hence undermine the WTO. Nevertheless, few aims to examine to what extent a country from the global south is willing to compromise with the western-led global governance arrangements by supporting the credibility of such an institution. To elaborate this issue, this article focuses on Indonesia's roles towards the Doha Development Round, particularly under the leadership of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). Within the round, Indonesia seems to enact conflicting roles. While it sometimes challenges western domination, Indonesia also takes a greater role in enhancing the credibility of the multi-lateral trade system.

By mobilising role theoretical approach, this article argues that multilateral trade governance, particularly the Doha Round, has been utilised by Indonesian foreign policymakers as an arena to play a greater role at the global level. To do so, Indonesia has enacted two leading overarching roles, namely the role of a *voice for developing countries* and the role of *bridge-builder*. Through the role of a voice for developing countries, Indonesia could enhance its domestic interests through consistent fights for the inclusion of concepts such as Special Product (SP) and Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) in the Doha Round. These two are directly related to the Indonesian government's domestic efforts to alleviate poverty, develop rural areas, and strengthen food security. The role of bridge-builder, however, stems from the opportunity to enhance Indonesia's international status by capturing the opportunity to fill the role to bridge the increasingly different standpoints of developing countries and developed countries in the negotiations.

Indonesia's leadership role as the coordinator of the G33, a defensive alliance of developing countries in the agricultural sector, which was enacted after the collapse of the Doha Round negotiations in Cancún, illustrates its enactment of the role as a voice for developing countries. Indonesia's bridge-builder role can be seen from its substantial initiatives and diplomacy in the breakthrough, albeit limited outcome of the ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali in 2013.

Despite Indonesia's increasing role enactment as a bridge-builder, which requires it also to support the liberalisation agenda at the global level, there has been a growing tendency towards protectionism in its trade policy in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008. Rather than reflecting the domestic policy preferences, international expectations towards Indonesia are more likely to drive the enactment of Indonesia's role as a bridge-builder in the Doha Round negotiations. At this point, the commitments made, as well as the rhetoric calling for a more liberalised

multilateral trading system within the negotiation by Indonesia are not in line with its domestic trade policies.

The reason for the gap between its global rhetoric and domestic policies can be interpreted as a result of the co-optation of trade policy in the WTO by the Indonesian foreign policy agenda. While the Ministry of Trade has full authority to formulate its trade negotiation position, Indonesia's role conception as a bridge-builder, enacted by its foreign policymakers, has significantly influenced its trade policy agenda and negotiating position in the Doha Round.

To facilitate the argument, the article draws upon in-depth interviews with Indonesian diplomats, former ministers of trade, trade policy bureaucrats, as well as top trade negotiators to understand the policy-making behind Indonesia's role in global multilateral trade system. It is also relied on official documents, statements, reports, and a press release issued by the Indonesian government and the WTO secretariat.

This article proceeds as follows. The article firstly conceptualises global trade governance as an arena for role-playing by building upon role theory literature. It examines how the multilateral negotiation within the WTO is seen as an arena, not only to enhance emerging powers' agenda and interests but also for states to project their role conceptions based on the alter expectations that they can fulfil. The third section discusses the co-optation of trade policy by the foreign policy agenda. It examines how the ambivalence between Indonesia's protectionist trade policy vis-à-vis its foreign policy outlook has led to the enactment of conflicting roles regarding global trade governance. The fourth and fifth sections provide a detailed account of how Indonesia has exercised its role in the G33 coalition within the Doha Round since 2003 and its increasing role as a bridge-builder since the collapse of the Round in 2008.

The Doha round as an arena for role enactment

The WTO, and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has traditionally been seen as an arena for states to negotiate and implement trade rules. Many studies have established that the WTO has been utilised as a platform by developing countries to challenge US dominance in regard to global trade governance (Anderson & Martin, 2005; Wade, 2011). As noted by several scholars, in their negotiation strategies, emerging countries such as India, Brazil, and South Africa tended to contribute to the deadlock of the WTO negotiations in the Doha development round due to their redistributive aspirations (Efsthopoulos, 2015; Stephen, 2012).

The studies on the coalition-building of developing countries in the Doha Round also shows that power politics has shaped the strategy as well

as the objectives of developing countries (Drahos, 2003; Hurrell & Narlikar, 2006; Narlikar & Tussie, 2004; Tadem, 2016). For instance, by employing a constructivist reading of the Philippines' behaviour in the WTO, Quinsaas (2012) shows that the coalition-building strategy among developing countries is the result of social learning and adaptation by trade negotiators within their interactions with other developing countries as well as developed ones. She further argues that given that the domestic structure may not pose heavy constraints to trade negotiators, power politics in the WTO, rather than interest based on a long-term programme formulated by states, is the main driver for developing countries' coalition-building strategy.

Hopewell (2015) further asserts that the greater role of developing countries in the WTO is not merely a result of increased material power resulting in their changing structural position. In her study on Brazil, China, and India, Hopewell argues that the rise of Brazil and India's leadership is not the result of their economic structural conditions as an emerging economic powerhouse. Rather, it can be attributed to their diplomatic efforts in mobilising coalitions amongst developing countries primarily through the G20¹ group, which has an offensive agenda in the agricultural sector. Through their diplomatic strategies, Brazil and India have created major challenges for developed countries seeking dominating roles in terms of agenda-setting within the WTO. However, their strategies have also created a stark divide between developing and developed countries. The politics of confrontation culminated in the collapse of the negotiations at the Cancún Ministerial Conference, in which developing countries seemed to be unified in resisting the developed countries' position (Hurrell & Narlikar, 2006).

Eagleton-Pierce (2013) provides a more critical approach towards the WTO by employing the Bourdieusian concept of symbolic power. He shows how the countries from the Global South tried to challenge the power imbalance within the Doha Round by mobilising symbolic power, namely providing heterodox opinions about a legitimate vision of the social world that challenged the orthodox liberalisation agenda of the developed countries. Hence, other than employing their institutional power by creating a coalition-building, developing countries from the Global South also use another source of power, which might not be based on material and institutional power.

Given the discussion above, the growing number of studies on how emerging powers behave in the multilateral setting, particularly in the Doha Round, are usually situated within debates on developing countries' struggle to challenge developed countries' dominance in global trade rule-making. While developing countries wanted to make the Doha round not merely an instrument of multilateral liberalisation, but also of development, developed countries viewed the round as a way to improve their market

access to developing countries (Muzaka & Bishop, 2015). Arguably, treating the WTO as an arena for developing countries to challenge Western hegemony only shows a partial picture of the emerging powers' behaviour in the WTO.

In this article, the Doha Round is treated not solely as an arena for developing countries to challenge Western hegemony; it is also treated as an arena for states to articulate their role conceptions, which are enacted by foreign policymakers to enhance their international status. Treating the Doha Round as a venue for the articulation of role conceptions can help us to understand the seemingly ambivalent and inconsistent nature of states' behaviour in international negotiations. In particular, we can understand why sometimes emerging powers enact a role that aims to challenge developed countries, while at other times they enact a role that aims to build bridges.

This article is not the first attempt to apply role theoretical approach in understanding states' behaviour in the WTO. Through the case of the EU's roles, Ahnlid and Elgström (2014) employed a role theory approach to understand how the changing power constellation regarding trade governance with the rise of the emerging powers and the relative decline of the US and the EU has created role uncertainty, which has forced the EU to change its role conception from a leader and a benign partner to developing countries to a more realist approach. However, their reading of role theory is still structural, in that role changes are seen as the product of structural changes in power constellations.

To further the discussion, this article aims to show that changes in the international system should also take into account a broader understanding of role dynamics happening within states. One of the aspects that is unexplored in the study of emerging powers' behaviour in global governance is how the WTO can be treated as an arena for the convergence and conflict between foreign policy and trade policy. The case of Indonesia's role in the multilateral trade negotiations is a case in point to illustrate how the role conception was a result of negotiation and co-optation of trade policy by the Indonesian foreign policy agenda.

Within IR scholarship, role conception defined as "an actor's perception of his or her position vis-a-vis others ... and the perception of the role expectations of others as signaled through language and action" (Breuning, 2011, p. 8). Originally, Holsti (1970, p. 14) defined role conception as "policymakers' definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system." Both definitions assign a greater role to policymakers in crafting role conceptions.

As established by literature in role theory, the sources of role conceptions come from two main factors namely, domestic and international expectations (Harnisch, 2011; Holsti, 1970; Thies, 2009). Role conception reflects some crucial domestic interest that needs to be achieved through an international stage. Role performance is also driven by international expectations in the form of national legal norms, the expectations of other governments, and peer groups expectation within a particular international or regional organization.

By treating the Doha Round as an arena to articulate role conceptions, the interaction within the WTO is not merely about a struggle to enhance particular domestic interests in multilateral rule-making as suggested by the mainstream literature on the WTO. Nor is the interaction solely understood as a power struggle between the developed and developing countries. Instead, the Doha Round was an arena in which states aimed to enact particular roles that could be associated with their domestic interest and their efforts to incorporate international expectations. In sum up, the different sources of role conceptions stemmed from domestic and international expectation as well as contestation by other ministries might lead to ambivalent or even conflicting roles at the Doha Round in the WTO.

From a reading of Indonesia's official documents on its standpoint in the Doha Round negotiations as well as interviews with both foreign and trade policymakers during Yudhoyono administration, this article reveals two main overarching roles that Indonesia wanted to enact within the WTO Doha round negotiations, namely a voice for developing countries and bridge-builder. These two role conceptions are associated with Indonesia's domestic interest and its current international expectation as an emerging democratic power. Its roles in Doha Round negotiations are case in point for Indonesia's aspiration to play a more significant roles outside of its previous foreign policy agenda.

Indonesia's growing role enactment as a voice for developing countries was also the result of the push for an anti-neoliberal agenda, resulting in a greater call for protectionism mainly in the agricultural sector. This role has been articulated since the Cancún Ministerial Conference in which Indonesia became the coordinator for the G33 developing country alliance. Indonesia's role as a bridge-builder is strategically enacted to fulfil expectations from the international audience, given Indonesia's significant position within the global economy (Santikajaya, 2016). The role of bridge-builder has been increasingly visible since the collapse of the Doha round negotiation in 2008 and Indonesia's admission to the G20 group in 2008. The role as a bridge-builder, which serves Indonesia's growing interest in being a moderating voice amid different actors in the international community.

However, due to democratization, Indonesia's state has undergone the fragmentation in which elites at different bureaucratic setting have

conflicting interests and strategies leading to policy incoherence (Karim, 2017, 2019). This fragmentation might lead to ambivalent enactment of role conceptions. A case in point for such incoherence is visible in Indonesia's enactment of role conception in foreign trade-related issues. Given the authority to formulate trade policy is in the hand of the Ministry of Trade, there is a chance for the enactment of roles by foreign policy-makers might be contested by other ministries. For roles conceptualised by the foreign minister to be enacted, this article further argues that there is a process of co-optation of trade policy by foreign policymakers agenda. The next section will examine how the trade policy under the authority of the Ministry of Trade has been co-opted as an instrument to operationalise the role conceptions developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The co-optation of trade policy by Indonesia's foreign policy agenda

To what extent is Indonesia's trade policy at the global level shaped by foreign policy agenda articulated by foreign policymakers? This article reveals that under Yudhoyono's Presidency, Indonesia's international trade policy at the global level was shaped by its aspiration to play more significant roles at the global level. This is evident in Indonesia's behaviour in the Doha Round, which started in 2001.

As demonstrated by many scholars, the democratisation undergone by Indonesia since the collapse of Suharto's authoritarian regime in 1998 has had significant repercussions for the decision-making process regarding Indonesia's trade policy (M. Chatib Basri & Hill, 2008; Bird, Hill, & Cuthbertson, 2008; Soesastro & Basri, 2005). This also applies to Indonesia's standpoint and negotiating position in multilateral trade governance, such as at the WTO. Under Suharto's authoritarian regime, the decision to negotiate in the WTO was more homogeneous, centralised and top-down; the president played an important role in the making of the final decisions (Bird et al., 2008). At that time, Indonesia, as a developing country, could be seen as a strong advocate of liberalism in the multilateral trading system due to its proposal for a very low tariff line for many products. The decision regarding trade liberalisation came directly from the President. The Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs then coordinated Indonesia's position in the negotiations.

After the collapse of Suharto's authoritarian regime, from 1999 to 2003, which can be considered an early stage of the post-authoritarian era, in practice, Indonesia did not take a leading role in the negotiations at the WTO. It was under Yudhoyono's leadership that Indonesia's involvement in the WTO was designated as one of the main venues that needed to be

developed in pursuit of Indonesia's status as a middle power (Karim, 2018). For the first time in the post-authoritarian period, the administration created Indonesia's trade diplomacy strategy, which was elaborated in the National Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPN) from 2005 to 2025 under Law 17 of 2007 as well as in the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN). The incorporation shows the importance of the coherence and alignment of Indonesia's trade interests with its diplomacy. Yudhoyono's Trade Minister from 2004-2011, Mari Elka Pangestu, articulated the concept of a 'multi-tracks trade strategy', which sought to make Indonesia play a greater role at the bilateral, regional, and global levels (*Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Kementerian Perdagangan Tahun 2010 [Performance Accountability Report of the Ministry of Trade in 2010]*, 2011). In the RPJPN as well as the RPJMN, Yudhoyono's government initially emphasised the urgency for trade diplomacy in the WTO because of the belief by officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it was through active involvement in the multilateral trading system that Indonesia could achieve its international status other than expanding the market for Indonesian goods. This urge is a part of overall Yudhoyono's foreign policy agenda which emphasised on Indonesia's active role at the regional and global levels.

However, officials within the Ministry of Trade are more sceptical regarding the importance of the WTO in enhancing the Indonesian foreign trade agenda in opening up the overseas market for Indonesian products. This is because negotiating an agreement at the WTO takes a long time. Consequently, many countries have opted for an FTA bilaterally and regionally. Moreover, given the importance of ASEAN due to Indonesia's aspiring role as a regional leader, many of the FTAs that Indonesia has signed and ratified have put ASEAN at the centre. By doing so, ASEAN can be internally strong and become a hub for East Asia's regional economic architecture building. Given this condition, the WTO has been seen as a second priority within Indonesia's foreign trade agenda at the Ministry of Trade. As revealed by interviews with Indonesian officials from the Ministry of Trade, the proliferation of regional free trade agreements, as well as the stalemate in the Doha Round, means that the WTO has been neglected by many Indonesian economic policymakers and legislators, who increasingly focus on regional free trade agreements (Former Indonesian trade attaché to Canada, personal communication, 12 September 2016).

Furthermore, many policymakers at the Ministry of Trade, particularly in the Directorate of Multilateral Negotiations, felt that under Yudhoyono, the implementation of WTO rules that informed the legislation process of national regulations and policies was at the lowest point (Interview with Director of Multilateral Negotiations, the Ministry of Trade, 11 September 2016). There are many domestic economic regulations related to the field

of trade that are not in the spirit of the WTO agreements as references in policy formulation. For instance, in 2012, the Ministry of Trade issued the Regulation of the Minister of Trade (Permendag) Number 60/2012 on Provisions on the Import of Horticultural Products. This regulation restricted the sale of imported beef only for restaurants and hotels, and not in traditional markets or supermarkets. Trading partner countries consider this import policy as distorting and protecting the domestic market and hence a violation of the WTO Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.

Thus, a prominent feature of trade diplomacy in the post-authoritarian era is that trade policy at home and Indonesia's trade rhetoric are not coherent and consistent. During Yudhoyono's first administration, initially, trade-related policies that often inconsistent with WTO rules were made by other agencies outside of the Ministry of Trade. In the second half of Yudhoyono's administration, the Ministry of Trade itself contributed and participated in ignoring the WTO rules. The leading cause of this was the growing sentiment of nationalism, which led to the WTO being increasingly perceived as part of an external force that threatened Indonesia's economic sovereignty (Musjtari, 2014).

Nevertheless, despite the WTO rules being neglected in the making of trade policy by related technical ministries, Indonesia's active involvement in the Doha round significantly increased. Given the fragmented situation within the domain of the trade policy-making process, Indonesia's negotiating position, which was supposed to reflect its trade policy agenda, became co-opted by the foreign policy agenda. Thus, Indonesia's position in the multilateral negotiations was driven more by foreign policy objectives than based on Indonesia's trade agenda. This stemmed from a growing desire in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to utilise trade governance as a platform to project its foreign policy agenda (Official from Directorate of Trade, Industry, Investment and Intellectual Property Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personal communication, 14 July 2015).

There are two main reasons why in the realm of multilateral trade negotiations, such as the Doha Round negotiation, the role conception developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is more dominant in influencing Indonesia's trade position. First, in the Uruguay Round, Indonesia successfully negotiated its commitment to schedules on concessions on goods set out by the article XXI of the GATS in accordance with the level of liberalisation that was accepted by domestic economic sectors.

Consequently, Indonesia's commitment to the WTO agreement is secure enough, even with a scenario in which Indonesia remained in the position of the status quo in the Doha Round. Under the existing agreement, Indonesia has bound 96.6% of its tariff lines at a rate of 40%. However, this agreement does not apply to Indonesia's agricultural sector, where tariffs

on more than 1,300 products have bindings at 47.7% (Tijaja & Faisal, 2014). Although it has a high bound tariff, the average rate applied is below 7%; currently it is 6.8%, lower than most ASEAN countries. Thus, Indonesia does not have to fight as hard as other developing countries in tariff reduction negotiations.

Moreover, Indonesia does not have to be as tough as Brazil in undertaking offensive strategies for agricultural products since an average tariff rate of 40% is a relatively safe level for Indonesia and is, in fact, rarely utilised. This gives greater flexibility for Indonesia to use tariffs as a main trade policy instrument. In addition, the existing agreements, in particular, the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) does not interfere with domestic interests as it accommodates the provisions of national legislation. Given this condition, there was greater space for Indonesia's foreign policy establishment to mobilise the Doha Round as an arena to play a more significant role in its pursuit of status.

Secondly, the formulation of Indonesia's positioning is highly dependent on the style of leadership and insight and is influenced by the figure of the Minister of Trade. It rarely happens that bureaucrats fill the post of the minister. The ministers of trade in the *reformasi* era were mostly academics and business practitioners whose insights were relatively limited regarding the politics of bureaucracy in the ministries. Nevertheless, the ministers of trade who were academics, such as Mari Elka Pangestu (2004 - 2011), had a relatively transparent, predictable and understandable vision regarding Indonesia's position as a developing country. Through her role in positioning Indonesia's role as a voice for developing countries, she was considered a respected figure within the WTO community.

Conversely, ministers who were business practitioners, such as Gita Wirjawan (2011 - 2014), tended to ignore the positioning of Indonesia as a developing country but somewhat being socialised into the positioning of Indonesia as an emerging power (Official, the Ministry of Trade, personal communication, 05 September 2017). This was particularly true after the inclusion of Indonesia in the G20, which requires Indonesia to show that its role is in line with its new international status. With a Minister who shares the same agenda in pursuing Indonesia's international status, it is easier to co-opt the foreign policy agenda into the domain of the Ministry of Trade as a focal point for the enactment of Indonesia's role conception within trade governance.

Having discussed how the foreign policy agenda could co-opt the international trade agenda, particularly in a multilateral forum such as the WTO, the next section will discuss how Indonesia's struggle for the agricultural sector has been framed as a way for Indonesia to enhance its role as a voice for developing countries.

Struggle for agriculture and the role as a voice for developing countries

In regard to its outlook towards trade liberalisation, Indonesia domestic trade policy in the post-authoritarian era can be summed up as an increased fear of liberalisation, which makes protectionism appealing within Indonesia's domestic environment (Chandra, 2016). In the early phase of democratisation from 1999 - 2004, many domestic political actors were increasingly suspicious of global economic institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO (Aspinall, 2016). This was a direct impact of the economic crisis and the subsequent ramifications of the IMF conditionality, which required the liberalisation of Indonesia's economy. Under the IMF conditionality, the Indonesian government was required to minimise the role of states in many economic sectors ranging from banking to agriculture.

In the agricultural sector, starting in 1999, several neoliberal reforms were put in place, such as allowing the market mechanism to determine rice prices, permitting massive rice imports, and cutting rice subsidies (WTO Secretariat, 2003, p. 6). Given that the majority of the Indonesian population are heavily reliant on the agricultural sector, the limited role of the state in the industry has negatively affected many rural and poor Indonesians. As a result of the structural reform imposed by the IMF, from 1999 to 2004, food-related product imports increased rapidly. During this period, Indonesia's import dependency ratio increased by twice as much as in 1998. For example, the ratio for rice reached 10%, corn 20%, soybeans 55% and sugar 50%. In the same period, these four commodities were consumed by 23 million, 9 million, 2.5 million, and 1 million households respectively, or 68% of the total of 52 million households in Indonesia (Direktorat Pangan dan Pertanian, 2006).

Policymakers within the Ministry of Agriculture viewed Indonesia's increasing reliance on food imports as not only a result of the IMF conditionality but also of broader inequality within the multilateral trade system that favoured the developed countries (Official, the Ministry of Agriculture, personal communication, 09 September 2017). Low food prices in the world market do not reflect the level of efficiency, but rather a distortion by the support provided by developed countries, primarily export subsidies and other domestic support to their farmers (Sawit, 2006). This market distortion has slowed the pace of development in developing countries. Besides, it hurts food security and rural development and hampers efforts to eradicate poverty in developing countries.

Although several administrations during the early phase of democratisation focused more on domestic issues (He, 2007), especially in ensuring political stability, under the Megawati Presidency, Indonesia gradually sought

to play a more significant role in voicing antagonism towards the WTO regulation, which was perceived as unfair. In 2001, during the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha, WTO member states agreed to launch the next round of negotiations, known as the Doha Development Agenda Round. The negotiations covered about 20 areas of trade, including agriculture. Given that half of Indonesia's population are somehow related to the agricultural sector, this sector became the primary concern for Indonesia during the Doha Round.

The launch of the Doha Round provided the newly democratic Indonesia, which was undergoing structural reform, an opportunity to voice its concerns regarding the neoliberal agenda imposed during the first five years of the Indonesian transition towards democracy (Soesastro & Basri, 2005). The Doha Round also provided a new arena for Indonesia to conceptualise its role conception as a voice for developing countries, which was relatively neglected during the last decade of Suharto's authoritarian regime, which focused on enacting the role of advocate of development.

One of the most challenging negotiation items within the Doha Round was a trade-in agriculture. Even though globally, the agricultural sector has a relatively small share of trade, accounting for only 4% of total global exports, the sector became a battleground between developing and developed countries in the Doha Round negotiations. This was due to the perceived unfairness in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) within the framework of the Uruguay Round, which became one of the founding agreements of the WTO (Gonzalez, 2002). The AoA aimed to reform trade in the agricultural sector and make policies more market-oriented, fair, and predictable. The rules and commitments stipulated in the AoA covered three pillars, namely (1) Market access (2) domestic support, and (3) export competition (Clapp, 2006).

To further boost its growing role conception as a voice for developing countries, Indonesia has continued to participate actively in various negotiations on agriculture at the WTO. This is evident in Indonesia being a Coordinator for the group of developing countries incorporated in the G33, which consists of 47 countries.² The idea to establish the G33 was developed during Indonesia's preparations for the fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in 2003, Cancún, Mexico. In March 2003, six months before the Ministerial Conference, Indonesia set up a proposal for a specific modality with the title: 'Specific Modalities Inputs on Strategic Products: Non-Paper by Indonesia' (Sawit, 2006).

The draft mainly contained Indonesia's idea to follow up on the failed concept of a development box proposed by Pakistan. The development box was envisioned as provisions that would only apply to developing countries and would consist of broad flexibilities rather than specific

prescribed policies targeting low-income farmers lacking resources, and secure supplies of staple foods. However, this proposal never gained traction in the Doha Round negotiations. Indonesia's proposal for specific modalities on strategic products was discussed with fellow developing countries in Geneva. The draft was finally accepted as a developing countries' proposal regarding strategic products.³ The proposal was sponsored by Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Nigeria, Turkey, Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela. It was the Philippines that initially called for the formation of the Alliance for Special Products and Special Safeguard Mechanism during the WTO special session of the Committee on Agriculture on 18 July 2003. On 9 September 2003, the coalition was established in Jakarta, Indonesia and became known as G33, given that the initial coalition consisted of 33 countries (Mably, 2009).

The G33 has the strategic objective of ensuring that the issues of food security, rural livelihood, and rural development become an integral part of the agriculture negotiation. Furthermore, the Group's goal is also to promote the notion of Special and Differential Treatment through the concepts of Special Products (SP) and a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). These two concepts should be embodied within the modalities of the WTO agriculture negotiations for all developing countries.

SP can be defined as specific agricultural products that receive special treatment in regard to the obligation around tariff cuts (Matthews, 2005). In essence, the category of SPs aims to protect and strengthen food production in developing countries, particularly basic staple foods, in order to provide food security, encourage the acceleration of rural development, and accelerate the alleviation of poverty and hunger. The Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) is aimed at protecting national farmers from the flooding of imported products. The concept of protection in the SSM is formulated as additional tariffs imposed on agricultural products to counter a surge in imports that negatively affects national farmers (Finger, 2010). The ideas for the SP and SSM were developed in accordance with the special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions, by which developing countries have special rights within the WTO rules (Hoekman, 2005).

Although Yudhoyono's presidency aimed to be seen as pro-economic openness and integration as well as sympathetic towards the liberalisation agenda, it continued to hold Indonesia's defensive position within the negotiation regarding the agricultural section given its leadership of G33. Thus, Indonesia's efforts to bring these two concepts to the negotiation table were increasingly embedded in Indonesia's standpoint in the Doha round. Since then, through the G33, Indonesia has always voiced the interests of developing and the least developed countries, which are heavily reliant on agriculture.

In April 2005, Indonesia held a commemorative Asian-African Summit, which became the official symbol for Yudhoyono's administration to enact Indonesia's historical role as a voice for developing countries. A G33 Ministers' informal breakfast meeting was held during the summit. To follow up the informal ministerial meeting, an official G33 Ministerial Meeting was held in June 2005 to discuss the G33's coordination, strategy, and position in the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, China in December 2005 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005). It could be argued that under Yudhoyono's presidency, its position within the G33 was strategically framed as Indonesia's effort to enact its historical role as a voice for developing countries. In this case, Indonesia's defensive position through G33 within the Doha round negotiation could have been utilised as part of its foreign policy agenda to be a global player.

By June 2005, 42 countries, including China, had joined the High-level G33 Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta, growing from thirty-three since its inception at the Cancun ministerial meeting. Currently, the G33 is composed of 46 developing countries and least developed countries. Considering the vast membership of the G33 coalition, ranging from underdeveloped countries to emerging powers, as well as its extensive geographic coverage, ranging from countries in Latin America and the Asia Pacific, it is not surprising that the G33 acquired enormous legitimacy in the WTO as a platform to voice developing countries' interests in the Doha Round negotiation (Eagleton-Pierce, 2013). However, given its size as well as the diverse interests of its members, it is difficult to maintain the cohesion of the different interests within the coalition. Indonesia, as the coordinator of the G33, tends to give priority to the cohesion of the coalition given the constantly changing strategic environment in the multilateral forum. To maintain its internal cohesion, the G33's broad agenda relies heavily on normative claims regarding the importance of food security for developing countries (Table 1) (WTO, 2019).

Even though Indonesia is the coordinator of the G33 coalition, it by no means always acts as a leader within the alliance. In fact, countries like the Philippines, India, China, Cuba, Turkey, and Venezuela are also among the most active members in voicing their concerns on behalf of the group (Wilkinson, 2006). As the coordinator, Indonesia has been preoccupied with maintaining the cohesion of the coalition. Internally, given the diversity of its membership, each member has its own standpoint and flexibility. For instance, some developing countries want the criteria for SP to be as abstract as possible given the difficulty for developing countries to be able to determine the criteria and indicators for any products that can be put into the SP scheme. This is due to the lack of government capacity in developing countries to have full data concerning their agricultural products.

Table 1. Enlargement of G33 membership.

Year	Member
2003 Alliance for Special Product and Special Safeguard Mechanism	Barbados, Botswana, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Mongolia, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
2016 G33	Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, China, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Republic of, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Chinese Taipei, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Source: WTO website, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_maps_e.htm?group_selected=GRP017.

After the failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún in 2003, at the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong 2005, Indonesia, through the G33, succeeded in incorporating the SP and SSM concepts into the Ministerial Declaration (Matthews, 2005).

Despite being the coordinator for the defensive coalition of developing countries in the agricultural sector, Indonesia is also a part of the Cairns Group, a coalition of agricultural exporters from developed and developing countries, which was conceived during the GATT negotiation on agriculture (Higgott & Cooper, 1990). Indonesia was an original member of the Cairns group when it was founded in 1986. Indonesia's membership of the Cairns group stems from its position as an exporter of agricultural products. Its membership of the group also shows Indonesia's greater support for liberalisation under the Suharto authoritarian regime in the 1980s.

With Indonesia's increasingly defensive position in the agricultural sector and its role as coordinator of G33, in the post-authoritarian era, Indonesia's membership of the Cairns Group gave it a unique position within the Doha Round of negotiations. This is because, within the Round, the Cairns Group had the objective of opening up and liberalising the market of agricultural products, which contrasted with the defensive nature of the G33 alliance.

Indonesia's membership of these two seemingly contradictory negotiating groups is a consequence of the structure of its agricultural trade performance. On the one hand, there are an increasing number of imported products that dominate the Indonesian domestic market, especially rice and soybeans, where domestic producers cannot meet the domestic demand. On the other hand, Indonesia still has the potential to increase its exports of agricultural commodities such as palm oil, coffee, rubber and cocoa. Djunari Inggit, then Director of Multilateral Negotiation within the Ministry of Trade, confirmed that the Indonesian government' positions in

the trade negotiations at the WTO reflect two essential interests, despite being contradictory to each other (Winanti et al., 2013).

As one of the world's leading exporters of tropical agricultural products, Indonesia does not want significant trade barrier for its products in the global market. Until 2014, although Indonesia's trade balance was in deficit, especially in the agriculture sector, a surplus could still be made, mainly through the export of plantation products such as palm oil (Trade Data & Information Center, 2017). Disruption of the export of agricultural products due to increased global protectionism would worsen Indonesia's trade balance. Given this state of affairs, Indonesia, along with other developing countries, insisted on flexibility in the trade liberalisation programme at the Doha Round meeting in Hong Kong in mid-December 2005. As stated by the then Minister of Trade Mari Elka Pangestu, responding to Indonesia's primary mission at the WTO, 'basically, what we are fighting for in the WTO is how we can get and fight for the interests of Indonesia and developing countries in a balanced way in this negotiation' (Merdeka.com, 2005).

Balancing its defensive strategy and the impetus to push the export of its agricultural products has been an underlying factor for Indonesia's membership of the Cairns group. However, many officials within the trade policy establishment argue that Indonesia's membership of the Cairns Group was not in line with its interest in the Doha Round (Directorate of Multilateral Negotiations, the Ministry of Trade, focused group discussion, 25 August 2016). Some argue that during the negotiations, the group never accommodated the interests of Indonesia. It complicates the position of Indonesia in the fight to defend the interests of farmers. The Cairns group, according to an Indonesian trade negotiator, is often pitting the developing countries against one another to prevent them from cooperating. Most of the group's positions and proposals were sponsored by a small number of developed countries in the Cairns Group, namely Australia and New Zealand. Interviews with trade negotiators reveal that before Cancún, there was a feeling that Indonesia had mistakenly aligned itself with members of Cairns Group that were predominantly agricultural net-exporter countries (Directorate of Multilateral Negotiations, the Ministry of Trade, personal communication, 22 September 2016). One negotiator even said that this coalition is very undemocratic (Personal communication, 22 September 2016). Almost all of the proposals and position papers were made on the initiative of Australia. The proposals were rarely discussed in a great length with other member states.

Despite this condition, Indonesian policymakers seemed to continue the dualism of Indonesia's position within the Doha Round. Under Yudhoyono, Indonesia's membership of the Cairns Group was maintained as a part of its growing bridge-builder role, in which Indonesia wanted to show its position

not only as part of a defensive coalition of developing countries but also as part of the liberalising force within the Doha Round. Thus, it could be argued that its membership of the Cairns Group is driven more by its foreign policy objectives. Its membership of these seemingly contradictory coalition groups has been framed as a strategy for Indonesia to be a bridge-builder in the Doha Round. Indonesia's membership of both the G33 and the Cairns Group has been mobilised to support its considerable effort to play the role of bridge-builder in the WTO. Indonesia's aspiring role as a bridge-builder can be further seen in the second collapse of the Doha Round negotiations in 2008 which the next section will discuss.

The return of protectionism and Indonesia's role as a bridge-builder

Since the collapse of the negotiations in Cancún in 2003 and later in Geneva in 2008, the growing division between developing countries, especially India and Brazil, and developed countries, especially the US and the EU, has hindered the progress of the Doha Round (Scott & Wilkinson, 2010). This tension has made a global consensus on this recent new round of multilateral trade increasingly challenging to materialise. Many commentators cite the issue of SP and SSM as the main factor that led to the collapse of the negotiation in 2008 (Davies, 2012; Ismail, 2009). This was due to the unwillingness of the developed countries to reduce domestic support to their agricultural sector, and at the same time, the G33 continued to fight for the inclusion of the framework of SP and SSM (Eagleton-Pierce, 2013).

While the collapse of the Doha Round negotiation at the Cancún Ministerial Conference in 2003 gave birth to the G33, which was eventually utilised as a platform for Indonesia to enact the role of a voice for developing countries, the collapse of the July 2008 package negotiation at the Geneva Ministerial Conference provided Indonesia with momentum to enact its role as a bridge-builder. Given the crisis of multilateralism reflected in the deadlock of the Doha Round, President Yudhoyono, along with Indonesian foreign policymakers, saw an opportunity to fill the gap of a voice for the developing countries that could bridge the stark divide within the negotiation.

Domestically, Indonesia's growing confidence in enacting the role of bridge-builder stems from its economic resilience during the 2007 - 2008 global financial crisis, which hit many economies. Moreover, Indonesia, alongside India and China, are among the few countries that experienced growth of more than 6% despite the crisis (Muhammad Chatib Basri & Rahardja, 2010). Indonesia's economic growth was the result of stable domestic consumption (Tambunan, 2010). In the same year, Indonesia was invited to join the G20, which has been upgraded from Ministerial level to

Head of State level, which transformed it into a premier forum for global economic cooperation. Given these conditions, the foreign policy establishment tends to see Indonesia as an emerging middle power and is willing to take a greater role at the global level.

Furthermore, Indonesia has been seen by the international community, especially Western powers such as the US and the EU, as a reliable partner from the developing countries that are supporting the liberal world order. As revealed by the interviews with Indonesia's top negotiators in the WTO, the international expectation that Indonesia would play a greater global role indeed shaped Indonesia's position as a bridge-builder in the Doha Round (General Director of International Trade, the Ministry of Trade, personal communication, 05 September 2016).

Since its inception in 2003, the G33 has been considered an instrument for Indonesia to play a greater role as a voice for developing countries, albeit in a defensive way. Since 2008, Indonesia has also increasingly utilised the G33 as a platform to enact the role of bridge-builder. Within G33, Indonesia aims to provide a more reasonable, doable, and readable position for the G33 to be presented at committees, general consultations, or special sessions. Indonesia has always tried to defuse the tough stance of some G33 member states that have an extreme position. In other words, Indonesia aims to redirect the G33 to find a middle ground.

Given its bridge-building and defensive nature, the US and the EU seem to have given more sympathy to G33 interests rather than the G20 coalition in the WTO. This is because while the G20 emphasised both commercial and non-commercial goals (developmental), the G33 mostly emphasised non-commercial objectives in the agricultural negotiations (Eagleton-Pierce, 2013). As put by an Indonesian negotiator, while the G33's defensive position is more directed to protecting the poor farmers from developing countries, the G20's offensive stance will disproportionately benefit big developing countries like Brazil, India, and China (Official, Directorate of Multilateral Negotiations, the Ministry of Trade, personal communication, 05 September 2016).

Indonesia's increasing enactment of the role of bridge-builder in the Doha round since the second term of the Yudhoyono presidency was puzzling when we take into account Indonesia's trade policies. During the first term of the Yudhoyono administration, Indonesia's trade policy could be characterised as more free-market-oriented and inclined towards trade liberalisation. This is evident from several trade policies, such as the easing of the import licence system, which allows a lot of imported goods to dominate Indonesia's domestic market easily. However, unlike in the first term, during the second term of the Yudhoyono administration, Indonesia's trade policies tended to be more inclined towards protectionism, especially in the

agricultural and mining sectors (Warburton, 2017). This protectionist tendency was likely to be a direct result of the efforts to mitigate the financial crisis that hit the world (Patunru & Rahardja, 2015).

In the second half of Yudhoyono's presidency, many protectionist measures were put in place. Chief among all of these were Law 13/2010 on Horticulture, Law 18/2012 on Food, Law 19/2013 on the Protection and Empowerment of Farmers, Law 3/2014 on Industry, and Law 7/2014 on Trade. The overall law mandates the government to conduct measures to protect agriculture and mining through a package of tariffs and quotas.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry have added new products to the list of products that require import and export licences. Besides, the Ministry of Trade also re-issued the import licensing rules on several products and issued rules on more stringent controls on the distribution of imported goods. This made the share of tariff lines subject to non-tariff measures (NTMs) on imports grow from 37% in 2009 to 51% in 2015 (Munadi, 2016). The number of NTMs for exports also increased three-fold during the same period and affected 41% of the export value.

Despite the protectionist tendency in its trade policy, within the Doha Round, Indonesia became increasingly vocal in voicing its concern for the WTO members to conclude the negotiations. Indonesia seemingly used a pro-liberalisation rhetoric and expressed its concerns about the rise of protectionism around the world. To further enact the role of bridge-builder, Indonesia intensified its involvement in forums initiated by the developed countries. In 2008, Indonesia hosted the 33rd meeting of the Cairns Group Ministerial Meeting (CGMM) in Bali ("CAIRNS Groups' Goal to Revive WTO negotiations," 2009). Indonesia also attended the Informal Ministerial Meeting in Paris, as well as the Summit of G8 + G5 in L'Aquila, at which the Indonesian government endorsed the need to push the Doha Round to be concluded (G8 Joint Statement, 2009, p. 8).

This dualism shows the conflict between Indonesia's role as a voice for developing countries, which culminated in its leadership role in the defensive coalition of the G33, and its aspiring role as a bridge-builder, which requires Indonesia to push for a more liberalised multilateral trade system. Moreover, the dualism also shows Indonesia's aspiration to be a bridge-builder, influenced by its foreign policy agenda, was not in line with the increasing domestic trade policy, which favoured protectionism.

Although Indonesia's aspiring role as a bridge-builder has created increasing role conflict with its stance as a proponent of the G33 and its domestic regulations, it continues to enact such a role. To substantiate its role conception as a bridge-builder, in 2012, Indonesia offered to host the ninth WTO Ministerial Conference. Policymakers perceived that this event would further boost Indonesia's credibility as an emerging middle power.

As stated by a former Indonesian trade minister, Gita Wirjawan, given its increasingly significant role in global governance, Indonesia should exercise its influence at the global level and take a more substantial role to reflect its position at the global level (personal communication, 16 September 2016). Through hosting the Conference, Yudhoyono's government indicated a desire to bridge the two major poles between developed countries and developing countries that had led to the Doha Round stalling. Hence, after the WTO General Council finally agreed that the next ministerial conference would be held in Bali, Indonesia's trade diplomacy objective was to secure an 'early harvest' of deliverables from the Doha Round.

In several negotiations leading up to the Bali ministerial conference, Indonesia tended to position itself as an emerging middle power that could be an honest broker within the WTO. In a small meeting of Trade Ministers at a side event of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos in late January 2013, the Indonesian Trade Minister, Gita Wirjawan, asserted that at the ninth WTO Ministerial Conference, Indonesia would fight to restore confidence in the multilateral trading system through the small but credible package to be agreed (Neumann & Washarti, 2013). Indonesia would support at least three agenda items to be achieved in the ministerial conference in Bali, namely trade facilities, packages for less developed countries, and the issue of public stockholding.

For the Yudhoyono administration, the ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali can be interpreted as a diplomatic stage on which Indonesia wished to play the role of bridge-builder. Given its protectionism policy back home, it would have been easier for Indonesia to defend itself from liberalisation by taking a stance against the liberalisation agenda. On the contrary, Indonesia pushed for the completion of the Doha Round even though this meant that it would have to give more concessions. Indonesia's position was directed towards making sure that an agreement was made in Bali, albeit minuscule. The Indonesian government framed the small agreement at the Ministerial Conference in Bali as a historic meeting that enhanced the legitimacy of the Doha Round.

At the ninth Ministerial Conference held in Bali, finally, the WTO member countries approved the Bali Package after tough negotiations. The agreed Bali Package comprised ten points and included issues on trade facilitation, resolving agricultural disputes, and discussions on issues affecting least-developed countries. This success was historical for the WTO, given that for the first time since the organisation began on 1 January 1995, an agreement had been reached (Wilkinson, Hannah, & Scott, 2014). The deal in Bali was seen as a significant small positive step for the multilateral trading system, which had recently begun to be eroded by the bilateral and regional cooperation initiatives undertaken by countries.

As revealed by Iman Pambagyo then the Director General of International Trade, the Ministry of Trade, Indonesia's position in pushing forward the Bali Package came from President Yudhoyono (personal communication, 16 September 2016). The success of the Bali Package then can be related to Indonesia's effort to play the role of bridge-builder. During the negotiations, to ensure that the outcome of the Bali Ministerial Conference was agreed, Indonesia even opposed India's position on public stockholding as a permanent solution instead of an interim one, despite its national interest regarding public stockholding being similar to India's due to the countries having the same domestic structural constraints, in which the majority of Indonesia's population are heavily reliant on agriculture.

Other than India, during the Ministerial Conference, some countries like Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Venezuela showed an opposing standpoint towards the Bali Package, particularly on Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) (Raja, 2014). They viewed the developed countries as benefiting from the absence of rules regarding the limitation of discrimination in the form of the embargo on transit goods. Their objection caused difficulty in reaching a consensus. As expressed by the Minister of Trade, Gita Wirjawan, to reach a consensus, the Indonesian delegation had to carry out personal lobbying with Latin American countries, especially Cuba. President Yudhoyono was also personally involved in lobbying the Heads of State of each country as well lobbying their Western counterparts, mainly the US (personal communication, 16 September 2016). Finally, a compromise was reached in the form of a sentence that upheld the principle of non-discrimination for transit goods being added to the Bali Package. This principle was essential for some countries like Cuba and Venezuela, where at the time of the agreement were on the US embargo list that could disrupt their trade with other countries.

Through the approval of the TFA, trade facilitation is expected to improve the efficiency of trade and customs procedures, resulting in reduced trade costs and facilitating small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to enter the global supply chain. Indonesia's view on the approval of the TFA is that it will also have a positive effect on the business and trade climate in facilitating Indonesian exports (Gita Wirjawan, personal communication, 16 September 2016).

Indonesia's seemingly inconsistent behaviour between its increasingly protectionist trade policies and the role it takes at the WTO shows that Indonesia's negotiation standpoint at the WTO is primarily driven by an effort to fulfil international expectations rather than reflecting its growing protectionist trade policies. As stated by one official from the Ministry of Trade, the Ministerial Conference in Bali was not about Indonesia's national interest but more about Indonesia's performance in pursuing the status of

a global player, namely through the role of bridge-builder (Official, Directorate of Multilateral Negotiations, the Ministry of Trade, personal communication, 15 September 2016). As a result, the Ministerial Conference became a critical 'diplomatic stage' where Indonesia could mobilise its role as a bridge-builder to pursue the status of an emerging middle power while seemingly overlooking its growing protectionist trade policies.

Indonesia's aspiring role as a bridge-builder, however, is problematic. Its commitment is not translated into further technical policies. This can be seen in the aftermath of the ninth Ministerial Conference, in which Indonesia was one of the slowest states to ratify the TFA. Two years later at the next Ministerial Conference, only sixty-three of the WTO members had ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement. Indonesia was not one of them, despite being the proponent of the TFA. Indonesia finally ratified it on 5 December 2017 under President Joko Widodo (Ribka, 2017).

Moreover, although the Ministerial Conference in Bali agreed with the interim solution on the public stockholding, the permanent solution was not resolved for almost a year after the Ministerial Conference (Agriculture Negotiations: Fact Sheet, 2014). The G33, of which Indonesia is the coordinator, still reiterated their pre-Bali position for a permanent solution by suggesting the moving of public stockholding programmes into the Green Box, allowing these programmes to be seen as domestic support that does not distort trade. Many developed countries rejected this permanent solution (Kanth, 2015). The lack of progress achieved after the Bali Package agreement led some developed countries, particularly the EU and Japan, to call for a new round of negotiations that would replace the Doha Round.

In a nutshell, Indonesia trade policy in Doha Round during Yudhonyono administration can be summed by the statement of a senior negotiator at the Indonesian Ministry of Trade:

Indonesia indeed acts as a bridge-builder in the Doha Round. Our posture in terms of politics and economic capacity makes Indonesia's role as a bridge-builder are trusted by negotiating partners. It is just that the role as a bridge-builder is more inclined to political interests and relatively far from trade interests. The Javanese proverb, '*tuna sathak, bathi sanak*' (material loss, but fortunate to get new relatives) precisely illustrates what this role means. In the end, this role has made Indonesian trade diplomacy as diplomacy of 'a mother', only giving not expecting anything (Official, Directorate of Multilateral Negotiations, the Ministry of Trade, personal communication, 26 September 2016).

Conclusion

This article has established that the Doha Round can be seen as an arena for role-playing in which international expectations pushed the state to

enact role that may not have been in line with its domestic economic interests. The third section of the article provided a detailed exploration how the co-optation of the trade policy by the foreign policy agenda led to greater flexibility for the foreign policy establishment to assert its role conceptions in an arena where the focal point to enact such a role was in the hands of the Ministry of Trade. This co-optation became the pre-condition for role-playing at the Doha Round to be conducted.

The last two sections of the article showed how Indonesia's roles as a voice for developing countries and a bridge-builder were enacted within the Doha Round negotiations. Indonesia's role as a voice for developing countries was translated into its leading role in enhancing the defensive agenda of the G33 as a coalition of developing countries at the WTO. Although at the beginning, the impetus for Indonesia to establish the coalition was a response from Megawati's administration towards a perceived unfair neoliberal reform after the collapse of Suharto's authoritarian regime, Indonesia's leadership of the G33 was framed and mobilised by Yudhoyono's administration as a continuation of its historical role as a voice for developing countries. Moreover, the article showed how Indonesia's growing active role as a bridge-builder stemmed from its treatment of the Doha Round as a diplomatic theatre in which it could play a role.

Thus, at the global level, Indonesia can perform the role of voice for developing countries while at the same time taking the role of bridge-builder without significant domestic contestation. This stems from views among domestic economic actors that do not emphasize the important aspects of the WTO as much as they focus on regional trade governance. Moreover, the enactment of role conceptions at the global level, which are relatively uncontested, is aided by the fact that commitments from being a bridge-builder are not necessarily translated into domestic trade policies. As a result, Indonesia's engagement in the WTO remains characterised by its rhetoric of enhancing trade liberalisation and will remain a venue for enacting its role conceptions as a bridge-builder and voice for developing countries.

The findings further suggest that its inconsistency in Doha Round could undermine Indonesia's endeavour to be a rising middle power with greater responsibility and initiative at the global level. Arguably the inconsistency makes Indonesia very difficult to follow through on global commitments, which makes it an unreliable partner. As a result, Indonesia's claims to middle power status with active foreign policy agenda appear fatuous at best.

Notes

1. G20 here refers to offensive coalition of agricultural exporters in the Doha Round.
2. At the beginning, the alliance consisted of 33 members hence the name of the group. However, it grows to include 47 developing countries.

3. Later, the notion of Strategic Products was replaced with Special Product in order to avoid confusion caused by the word strategic that can refer to military-related issues.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor

Moch Faisal Karim is an Assistant Professor within International Relations Programme at Bina Nusantara University. His research has been published in *Contemporary Politics*, *Third World Quarterly*, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, *Pacific Review*, *Asian Journal of Social Science*, *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, and *Journal of ASEAN Studies*. Faisal holds PhD from the University of Warwick and was previously a Global Challenges Junior Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study and the School of Public Policy at the Central European University, Budapest, and the Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin.

ORCID

Moch Faisal Karim  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5444-2141>

References

- Agriculture Negotiations: Fact Sheet. (2014). *The Bali decision on stockholding for food security in developing countries*. WTO. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/factsheet_agng_e.htm
- Ahnlid, A., & Elgström, O. (2014). Challenging the European Union: The rising powers and the USA in the Doha Round. *Contemporary Politics*, 20(1), 77–89. doi:10.1080/13569775.2014.881606
- Anderson, K., & Martin, W. (2005). Agricultural trade reform and the Doha Development Agenda. *The World Economy*, 28(9), 1301–1327. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2005.00735.x
- Aspinall, E. (2016). The New Nationalism in Indonesia. *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, 3(1), 72–82. doi:10.1002/app5.111
- Basri, M. C., & Hill, H. (2008). Indonesia – Trade Policy Review 2007. *World Economy*, 31(11), 1393–1408. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2008.01134.x
- Basri, M. C., & Rahardja, S. (2010). The Indonesian Economy amidst the global crisis: Good policy and good luck. *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, 27(1), 77–97. doi:10.1355/AE27-1E
- Bird, K., Hill, H., & Cuthbertson, S. (2008). Making trade policy in a new democracy after a deep crisis: Indonesia. *World Economy*, 31(7), 947–968. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2008.01110.x
- Breuning, M. (2011). Role theory research in international relations. In S. Harnisch, C. Frank, & H. W. Maull (Eds.), *Role theory in international relations* (pp. 16–35). Abingdon: Routledge.

- CAIRNS Groups' Goal to Revive WTO negotiations: Groundless - Via Campesina. (2009, June 6). *Via Campesina English*. Retrieved from <https://viacampesina.org/en/cairns-groups-goal-to-revive-wto-negotiations-groundless/>.
- Chandra, A. C. (2016). Regional economic building amidst rising protectionism and economic nationalism in ASEAN. *Journal of Asean Studies*, 4(1), 1–19. doi:10.21512/jas.v4i1.878
- Clapp, J. (2006). WTO agriculture negotiations: Implications for the Global South. *Third World Quarterly*, 27(4), 563–577. doi:10.1080/01436590600720728
- Davies, M. (2012). The Perils of Incoherence: ASEAN, Myanmar and the Avoidable Failures of Human Rights Socialization? *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, 34(1), 1–22.
- Direktorat Pangan dan Pertanian. (2006). *Profil Pangan dan Pertanian Indonesia 2003–2006*. Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional. Retrieved from <https://www.bappenas.go.id/files/5713/5229/9214/2-profil.pdf>.
- Drahos, P. (2003). When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization. *International Negotiation*, 8(1), 79–109. doi:10.1163/138234003769590677
- Eagleton-Pierce, M. (2013). *Symbolic power in the World Trade Organization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Efstathopoulos, C. (2015). *Middle powers in World Trade Diplomacy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 10.1057/9781137381767_2.
- Finger, J. M. (2010). A Special Safeguard Mechanism for Agricultural Imports: What experience with other GATT/WTO safeguards tells us about what might work. *World Trade Review*, 9(2), 289–318. doi:10.1017/S1474745609990243
- G8 Joint Statement. (2009). *L'Aquila summit: Promoting the global recovery*. Official Italian G8 website. Retrieved from <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2009laquila/2009-g5-g8.html>.
- Gonzalez, C. G. (2002). Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries Symposium: Trade, Sustainability and Global Governance. *Columbia Journal of Environmental Law*, 27, 433–490.
- Hameiri, S., & Zeng, J. (2019). State transformation and China's engagement in global governance: The case of nuclear technologies. *The Pacific Review*, 1–31. doi:10.1080/09512748.2019.1613441
- Harnisch, S. (2011). Role theory: Operationalization of key concepts. In S. Harnisch, C. Frank, & H. W. Maull (Eds.), *Role theory in international relations*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- He, K. (2007). Indonesia's foreign policy after Soeharto: International pressure, democratization, and policy change. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 8(1), 47–72. doi:10.1093/irap/lcm021
- Higgott, R. A., & Cooper, A. F. (1990). Middle power leadership and coalition building: Australia, the Cairns group, and the Uruguay round of trade negotiations. *International Organization*, 44(4), 589–632. doi:10.1017/S0020818300035414
- Hoekman, B. (2005). Operationalizing the concept of policy Space in the WTO: Beyond special and differential treatment. *Journal of International Economic Law*, 8(2), 405–424. doi:10.1093/jielaw/jgi027
- Holsti, K. J. (1970). National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 14(3), 233–309. doi:10.2307/3013584

- Hopewell, K. (2015). Different paths to power: The rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade Organization. *Review of International Political Economy*, 22(2), 311–338. doi:10.1080/09692290.2014.927387
- Hopewell, K. (2017). The BRICS—merely a fable? Emerging power alliances in global trade governance. *International Affairs*, 93(6), 1377–1396. doi:10.1093/ia/iix192
- Hurrell, A., & Narlikar, A. (2006). A new politics of confrontation? Brazil and India in multilateral trade negotiations. *Global Society*, 20(4), 415–433. doi:10.1080/13600820600929762
- Ismail, F. (2009). An assessment of the WTO Doha Round July–December 2008 collapse. *World Trade Review*, 8(4), 579–605. doi:10.1017/S1474745609990073
- Kahler, M. (2013). Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change in a resilient status quo. *International Affairs*, 89(3), 711–729. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12041
- Kanth, D. R. (2015, June 29). US-EU Block permanent solution for food security public stockholding. South-North Development Monitor. Retrieved from <http://www.twn.my/title2/susagri/2015/sa404.htm>.
- Karim, M. F. (2017). Institutional Dynamics of regulatory actors in the recruitment of migrant workers. *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 45(4–5), 440–464. doi:10.1163/15685314-04504004
- Karim, M. F. (2018). Middle power, status-seeking and role conceptions: The cases of Indonesia and South Korea. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 72(4), 343–363. doi:10.1080/10357718.2018.1443428
- Karim, M. F. (2019). State transformation and cross-border regionalism in Indonesia's periphery: Contesting the centre. *Third World Quarterly*, 40(8), 1554–1570. doi:10.1080/01436597.2019.1620598
- Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja Kementerian Perdagangan Tahun 2010 [Performance Accountability Report of the Ministry of Trade in 2010]. (2011). Bureau of Planning, Secretariat General, Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia. <http://www.kemendag.go.id/files/pdf/2012/12/06/lakip-2010-id0-1354798811.pdf>.
- Mably, P. (2009). Centralized production: The group of 33. In D. Tussie (Ed.), *The politics of trade: The role of research in trade policy and negotiation* (pp. 239–270). Netherlands: Brill.
- Matthews, A. (2005). The road from Doha to Hong Kong in the WTO agricultural negotiations: A developing country perspective. *European Review of Agricultural Economics*, 32(4), 561–574. doi:10.1093/erae/jbi031
- Merdeka.com. (2005, December 8). Indonesia Ngotot Perjuangkan Fleksibilitas Liberalisme Perdagangan di WTO. *Merdeka.Com*. Retrieved from <https://www.merdeka.com/uang/indonesia-ngotot-perjuangkan-fleksibilitas-liberalisme-perdagangan-di-wto-l0fbyoa.html>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2005). *Indonesia will host the G-33 Ministerial Meeting*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia. Retrieved from <https://www.kemlu.go.id/en/berita/siaran-pers/Pages/Indonesia-will-host-the-G-33-Ministerial-Meeting.aspx>
- Munadi, E. (2016). Indonesia's non-tariff measures: An overview. In L. Y. Ing, S. F. de Cordoba, & O. Cadot (Eds.), *Non-tariff measures in ASEAN* (pp. 65–76). Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
- Musjtari, D. N. (2014). Dampak Liberalisasi Perdagangan dalam WTO Agreement terhadap Ketahanan Pangan Indonesia. *Kanun: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum*, 16(2), 221–246. doi:10.24815/kanun.v16i2.6028.

- Muzaka, V., & Bishop, M. L. (2015). Doha stalemate: The end of trade multilateralism? *Review of International Studies*, 41(2), 383–406. doi:10.1017/S0260210514000266
- Narlikar, A. (2006). Peculiar chauvinism or strategic calculation? Explaining the negotiating strategy of a rising India. *International Affairs*, 82(1), 59–76. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00515.x
- Narlikar, A., & Tussie, D. (2004). The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and Their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO. *World Economy*, 27(7), 947–966. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9701.2004.00636.x
- Neumann, A. L., & Washarti, R. (2013, November 29). The WTO in Bali: What to Expect Exclusive interview with Trade Ministry DG Iman Pambagyo. *Strategic Review*. Retrieved from <http://www.sr-indonesia.com/web-exclusives/view/the-wto-in-bali-what-to-expect>
- Patunru, A., & Rahardja, S. (2015). *Trade protectionism in Indonesia: Bad times and bad policy* [Analysis]. Lowy Institute for International Policy. Retrieved from <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/trade-protectionism-indonesia-bad-times-and-bad-policy>
- Quinsa, S. M. (2012). The Philippines Waltzes with the Big Boys: Coalition-building Strategy in the WTO. *Asian Survey*, 52(5), 970–994. doi:10.1525/as.2012.52.5.970
- Raja, K. (2014, February). WTO conference closes after adopting Bali package. *TWN: Third World Network*, 21–22.
- Ribka, S. (2017, October 23). Indonesian lawmakers agree to ratify WTO's TFA. *The Jakarta Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/10/23/indonesian-lawmakers-agree-ratify-wto-s-tfa.html>
- Santikajaya, A. (2016). Walking the middle path: The characteristics of Indonesia's rise. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 71(4), 563–586. doi:10.1177/0020702016686381
- Sawit, M. H. (2006). Indonesia dalam Tatanan perubahan Perdagangan Beras Dunia. *Jurnal Pangan*, 15(2), 16–23. Retrieved from <http://www.jurnalpangan.com/index.php/pangan/article/view/291>
- Scott, J., & Wilkinson, R. (2010). What happened to Doha in Geneva? *The European Journal of Development Research*, 22(2), 141–153. doi:10.1057/ejdr.2010.6
- Soesastro, H., & Basri, M. C. (2005). The Political Economy of Trade Policy in Indonesia. *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, 22(1), 3–18. doi:10.1355/AE22-1B
- Stephen, M. D. (2012). Rising Regional Powers and International Institutions: The Foreign Policy Orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa. *Global Society*, 26(3), 289–309. doi:10.1080/13600826.2012.682277
- Stephen, M. D., & Parizek, M. (2019). New powers and the distribution of preferences in global trade governance: From deadlock and drift to fragmentation. *New Political Economy*, 24(6), 735–758. doi:10.1080/13563467.2018.1509065
- Tadem, T. S. E. (2016). Negotiating North–South dynamics and the Philippine experience in the WTO. *The Pacific Review*, 29(5), 717–739. doi:10.1080/09512748.2015.1040055
- Tambunan, T. T. H. (2010). The Indonesian experience with two big economic crises. *Modern Economy*, 1(3), 156–167. doi:10.4236/me.2010.13018
- Thies, C. G. (2009). Role Theory and Foreign Policy*. *International Studies Association Compendium Project*.
- Tijaja, J., & Faisal, M. (2014). *Industrial Policy in Indonesia: A Global Value Chain Perspective* (ADB Economics Working Paper Series). Manila: Asia Development Bank.

- Trade Data and Information Center. (2017). *Total Balance of Trade of Indonesia*. Ministry of Trade, Republic of Indonesia. Retrieved from <http://www.kemendag.go.id/en/economic-profile/indonesia-export-import/indonesia-trade-balance>
- Wade, R. H. (2011). Emerging world order? From multipolarity to multilateralism in the G20, the world bank, and the IMF. *Politics & Society*, 39(3), 347–378. doi:10.1177/0032329211415503
- Warburton, E. (2017). Resource Nationalism in Indonesia: Ownership structures and sectoral variation in mining and palm oil. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 17(3), 285–312. doi:10.1017/jea.2017.13
- Wilkinson, R. (2006). The WTO in Hong Kong: What it really means for the Doha Development Agenda. *New Political Economy*, 11(2), 291–304. doi:10.1080/13563460600655672
- Wilkinson, R., Hannah, E., & Scott, J. (2014). The WTO in Bali: What mc9 means for the Doha Development Agenda and why it matters. *Third World Quarterly*, 35(6), 1032–1050. doi:10.1080/01436597.2014.907726
- Winanti, P. S., Arfani, R. N., Putra, A. A., Suberata, I. G. K. C. B., Syarifuddin, M. R., & Puspaningrum, V. (2013). *The Future of Doha Round: Optimalisasi Diplomasi Ekonomi Indonesia dalam Kerangka WTO* (Practices in Trade and Indonesian Encounters). Pusat Studi Perdagangan Dunia.
- WTO. (2019). Map of negotiating groups in the Doha negotiations. Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/negotiating_groups_maps_e.htm?group_selected=GRP017
- WTO Secretariat. (2003). Trade Policy Review, Indonesia. Trade Policy Review Body, WTO. Retrieved from https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/ExportFile.aspx?ld=82607&filename=Q/WT/TPR/S117-0.pdf