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RESEARCH ARTICLE



Re-territorialization and the governance of ocean frontiers in Indonesia

Dinna Prapto Raharja and Moch Faisal Karim

ABSTRACT

This article examines the development of Indonesia's ocean policy, particularly during the presidency of Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo (2014–present). Re-territorialization is the primary driver of Indonesia's ocean policy under Widodo, enabling the state to create and commodify property regimes within Indonesian-controlled oceans. As a large archipelagic nation with multiple neighbours, Indonesia's ocean frontiers face numerous challenges, including illegal fishing, cross-ocean trade and transport, and geopolitical tensions, especially in the South China Sea. As a result, Indonesia has been mobilizing state resources to establish and solidify control in three aspects of its ocean frontiers: jurisdictional frontiers, political frontiers and commodification frontiers. In his first term (2014–19), President Widodo's ocean policy was driven by the urge to control jurisdictional and political frontiers, while his current second term agenda emphasizes capturing commodification frontiers. These different approaches should not be seen as inconsistent but rather as a continuation of Indonesia's efforts to strengthen governance of its ocean frontiers.

KEYWORDS

territorialization; ocean governance; Indonesia's ocean policy; ocean frontier

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1. INTRODUCTION

Despite being the world's largest archipelagic country and having abundant marine potential, Indonesia's maritime and marine development is sectorally oriented and fragmented, resulting in significant policy overlap in both implementation and management (Cribb & Ford, 2009; Rochwulaningsih et al., 2019). In fact, maritime development only began formally to be considered in Indonesia's national planning documents during the implementation of the Sixth Mid-term Development Agenda (1994–99), when the main focus was the inventory and evaluation of marine potential (Bappenas, 2014). In the post-authoritarian period (1999–onwards), specifically under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14), Indonesia's ocean policy became increasingly focused on developing the fisheries sector in order to boost the country's exports. A systemic approach to Indonesia's ocean development agenda, however, was largely absent.

It has only been under the presidency of Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo's (2014–present) that the Indonesian state has devised a wide range of new institutions, projects and programmes to govern oceans and marine resources. Since 2014, Widodo has made maritime development a top priority

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agenda for his government. This is driven by his vision for Indonesia to become the ‘global maritime fulcrum’, with Indonesia as the point on which the world’s lever pivots, actively playing the role of confronting and balancing any power that seems to disturb the regional balance (Sulaiman, 2017). This approach simultaneously supports the Indonesian state in its attempts to uphold sovereignty over its maritime territory. Widodo’s commitment to maritime affairs was made clear in 2014 by the inclusion of a new coordinating ministry in his governing portfolio: the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime and Investment.¹ The Coordinating Ministry is in charge of planning maritime affairs and coordinating several ministries relevant to the governance of Indonesia’s ocean frontiers: the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, the Ministry of Transportation, and the Ministry of Investment. Both the formation and the significant responsibility of the Coordinating Ministry affirms Widodo’s re-prioritization of governing Indonesia’s oceans. Three years later, in 2017, Widodo also signed a presidential decree establishing the first Indonesian Ocean Policy Blueprint.² The blueprint serves as a general guideline for programmes and activities of ministries and agencies in the maritime sector, and aims to accelerate the achievement of the global maritime fulcrum vision.

This article examines the nature, development, drivers and implications of Indonesia’s ocean policy, especially under the Widodo administration. Primary data were obtained through a focus group discussion with Indonesian government officials from the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, the Ministry of Transportation, the Indonesian Coast Guard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Ministry of Marine and Fisheries in East Kalimantan, the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Human Rights, and the Ministry of Manpower (9 September 2020, with 39 participants); a focus group discussion with Indonesian academics and civil society activists in field of fisheries and socio-politics, including an advisor to the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (26 October 2020, with 23 participants); a regional focus group discussion with government representatives (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Indonesian Coast Guard), academics and civil society activists, representatives of business association in fisheries, and representatives of international fora and organizations working on relevant issues (International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Labor Organization (ILO), Bali Process, Plan International) from Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Philippines and Vietnam (24 February 2021, with 53 participants); and in-depth interviews with Indonesian stakeholders (22 participants). The focused group discussions (FGDs) were co-hosted by the Foundation of International Human Rights Reporting Standards, a non-profit organization, and the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment. These discussions were transcribed and analysed thematically.

To understand Indonesia’s ocean policy, we conceptualize the ocean through the notion of frontier space as an organizing framework for this article. Following Havice and Zalik (2018), oceans can be seen as the last planetary frontier: they have become the site for the creation of commodities, territorial control and appropriation. Moreover, the notion of frontier space, which is usually applied in relation to land frontiers, can provide meaningful insights into the dynamics of oceanic regulation, conservation and exploitation. The notion of ocean frontiers, then, enables us to view the ocean not only as a spatial site but also as a contested political space.

Widodo’s ocean development policy is shaped by the need to re-territorialize Indonesia’s ocean frontier amid the growing illegal and unreported activities in Indonesian waters, including its exclusive economic zones (EEZ), as well as increasing geopolitical tension with neighbours and regional powers such as China. Re-territorialization of the ocean frontier represents a strategy to create systems of resource control, rights, authorities, jurisdictions and their spatial representations (Rasmussen & Lund, 2018). In Widodo’s administration, the ultimate goal of re-territorialization is to control and effectively manage Indonesia’s rich maritime resources for economic

development. We identify three aspects of ocean frontiers in which the Indonesian state aims to assert its power: jurisdictional frontiers, political frontiers and commodification frontiers.

During his first term (2014–19), Widodo aimed to expand the presence of state power in governing Indonesia's ocean frontiers. This can be seen in his government's efforts in actively zoning Indonesia's seas, building up its maritime diplomacy, enacting strict measures to punish illegal foreign vessels that fish in Indonesian waters, banning transshipment and the use of trawlers (Regulation of Minister of Fishery no. 71/2016; Regulation of Minister of Fishery no. 57/2014). Now in his second term (2019–present), Widodo's maritime agenda has been driven largely by the growth of state power to support capitalist exploitation of the sea. Widodo even overturned some of his first-term policies on environmental conservation and shifted more towards efforts to tap into increasing investment in capture fisheries. As a result, the government now welcomes foreign investment in capture fisheries and allows transshipment within Indonesia's territory.

While these two agendas might be perceived as contradictory, Widodo's ocean policy can be interpreted as an ongoing process of oceanic re-territorialization, enabling the state to create and commodify property regimes within Indonesia's maritime territory. Widodo's first term, then, emphasized controlling jurisdictional and political frontiers, while his second term is focusing on capturing commodification frontiers. Widodo's government employs a wide range of strategies to do this, including legislation, discursive organization of space, spatial planning and the construction of physical infrastructure.

This article contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to our understanding of Indonesia's ocean policy under the Widodo administration. Much of the existing scholarship focuses on international aspects of Indonesia's ocean policy and its implications on the country's position in Southeast Asia (McRae, 2019; Wicaksana, 2017; Parameswaran, 2020). Some literature explores the security dimension of Indonesia's ocean policy by looking at how key maritime actors within the Indonesian state demonstrate a diverse understanding of what constitutes maritime security (Chapsos & Malcolm, 2017). Other literature focuses on the political economy of Indonesia's fisheries sector by looking at the domestic struggle between businesses and the state in the making of ocean policy (Scarpello, 2020), or framing the development of maritime policies as a way of developing the Indonesian economy (Rochwulaningsih et al., 2019). This article brings a critical geography perspective in order to enhance our understanding of Indonesia's ocean policy. Second, we situate our analysis within the debate on state re-territorialization and ocean governance. A growing literature aims to unpack how the notion of (re-)territorialization can be applied to oceans (Havice & Zalik, 2018; Havice, 2018; Campbell & Colás, 2018; Foley & Mather, 2019). Hence, our study brings the case of Indonesia – as the world's largest archipelagic country – into the conversation.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The second section develops a conceptual framework by connecting notions of ocean frontiers, territorialization (and re-territorialization), and sovereignty to understand Indonesia's ocean policy. The third section discusses the evolution of the Indonesian state's struggle to control its ocean frontiers. The fourth, fifth, and sixth sections analyse the process of (re-)territorialization of ocean frontiers during the Widodo administration. The seventh section assesses its success.

2. GOVERNING OCEAN FRONTIERS

2.1. Sovereignty, capital and territorialization of Indonesia's oceans

To further understand Indonesia's policy towards maritime development, the notion of frontier spaces enables us to make sense of seemingly contradictory policies taken by Widodo's administration in the first and second terms of his presidency. A frontier can be seen as a zone of declining power situated in the margin of national territory. However, frontiers also provide significant

opportunities for economic expansion (Steinberg, 2018). Such expansion towards frontiers is conducted through the creation of authority, control and institutional orders. Hence, the notion of frontier spaces cannot be separated from the discussion of territorialization (Rasmussen & Lund, 2018).

Territorialization is a strategy of resource control in a bounded territory that aims to achieve particular outcomes involving the classification of particular areas in order to regulate people and resources (Vandergeest & Peluso, 1995). Given the objective of territorialization is tightly associated with resource control, such processes are intertwined with the notion of sovereignty. This is because territorialization requires the state not only to be able to control a particular territorial space but also to engage with processes outside of, and foreign to, those territorial bounds (Agnew, 1994; Sidaway, 2003). In other words, the state needs to contextualize its territorialization efforts as a way of strengthening sovereignty.

The mainstream literature in international relations treats sovereignty as international recognition from states; that is, the ability of states and their infrastructure to effectively regulate behaviour within specific territory, the exclusion of external sources of authority and the capacity of states to control intra-border movement (Krasner, 1999). However, such understanding can become blurred in frontiers or border territories due to lack of state capacity to control its own territory. Furthermore, as argued by Lunstrum (2013), understanding sovereignty by only looking at a state's power in asserting sovereignty within its own territory is not sufficient, as the notion also relies on interactions with foreign actors that provide support for a state's authority in that territory. This is particularly true with regard to state control over oceanic territories, where assertion of sovereign authority and control is sometimes obtained through the creation of global regime (Chan, 2018).

Moreover, the territorialization of states in asserting their sovereignty cannot be separated from the discussion on capital accumulation. Much literature has shown how intensified globalization can be considered as the primary driver of the territorialization of frontier spaces (Rasmussen & Lund, 2018; Peluso & Lund, 2011). Once a state has established sovereign rights over a particular frontier space, it aims to attract both global and domestic capital to engage in resource extraction in those spaces (Havice, 2018). This tendency is closely linked to the growing neoliberal agenda, especially in terms of privatization and marketization as dominant modes of ocean governance. While the neoliberal agenda for oceans has pushed the notion of open access and freedom of the sea, such impetus for economic growth has led to oceanic territorialization as an instrument to turn maritime areas into sites for resource extraction (Mansfield, 2004). Campbell and Colás (2018) assert that this is an important shift with regards to the discussion of sovereignty at sea: from a state-centred discussion of political occupation of territories to one that focuses on the role of sea as a resource.

In this article, we utilize insights provided by literature on territorialization, sovereignty and capital accumulation as the framework to understand Indonesia's ocean policy under the Widodo administration. While the Indonesian state has, on paper, authority over its ocean frontiers, in reality such authority has not translated into the country's ability to exploit maritime resources. In fact, due to ambiguous ownership and management rights (Oegroseno, 2009), as well as limited ability to control a large area of its ocean frontiers, Indonesia has experienced a process of deterritorialization resulting in several Indonesian border islands coming under the influence or even control of neighbouring countries such as Sipadan and Ligitan islands. Therefore, the territorialization of Indonesian ocean frontiers is not only needed to strengthen Indonesia's political sovereignty over said frontiers but also to strengthen the state's ability to exploit maritime resources.

Territorialization of ocean frontiers is not a one-time policy. States need to constantly reterritorialize their control over maritime areas if they are unable to maintain *de facto* control due to lack of capacity. This is particularly true in the case of Indonesia, where the process of

territorialization of ocean frontiers began in 1957, when Indonesia declared itself to be an archipelagic state in which maritime territorial boundaries are measured from the outermost point of its islands. Hence, 're-territorialization' is the more appropriate term to understand Indonesia's contemporary maritime policy, especially during the current Widodo administration, where there has been renewed mobilization of state power with the objective of further capturing maritime resources.

Having discussed the reterritorialization to govern ocean frontiers, we will now identify the types of ocean frontiers that the Indonesian state seeks to govern. Building upon the works of scholars of territorialization (Havice, 2018; Foley & Mather, 2019; Vandergeest, 2018), we focus on the three aspects of ocean frontiers: jurisdictional, political and commodification frontiers. One should note that ocean frontiers do not solely refer to the high seas per se. In fact, internal waters, territorial waters and EEZs can also be considered ocean frontiers. This is particularly true for Indonesia. Although the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) states that, as an archipelagic country, Indonesia has sovereignty over the internal seas that lie inside the Indonesian archipelago, the LOSC also gives Indonesia economic rights over 200 nautical miles from its internal waters. However, as confirmed by our government and non-government informants, due to the Indonesian government's relatively weak record in developing regulatory regimes for maritime activities, a lack of mastery of modern technology in its handling of legal economic activities at sea and a poor record system in managing the interests of its seafarers (Cribb & Ford, 2009), it is evident that Indonesia's coastal areas, internal waters and EEZs are also frontier spaces that need to be controlled and regulated.

2.2. Ocean as jurisdictional, political and commodification frontiers

The configuration of frontier spaces is deeply dependent on the nature of the resources in question. An ocean frontier is characterized by distance from shore as well as the highly mobile nature of fish stocks (Toonen & Bush, 2020). This has made ocean frontiers difficult to control and regulate. For instance, Vandergeest (2018) shows that regulating labour relations at sea can also be seen as a jurisdictional frontier in the ocean governance. He shows that unlike terrestrial labour regulation, regulating oceanic labour, particularly with regard to marine fisheries, has its own challenges. First, regulating labour upon vessels at sea is complex due to their mobile but constrained nature; second, fisheries vessels can easily move in and out of state territorial jurisdictions; and third, fisheries industries often employ a highly mobile transnational labour force.

Political frontiers in the context of ocean governance refer to the ability of the state to control its seas, particularly in border areas. Indonesia has maritime boundaries with 10 countries, more than any other country in the world: India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Australia and Timor-Leste (Oegroseno, 2009). Many boundary negotiations have been proposed or commenced but ongoing delimitation negotiations have yet to produce results. Our interviews with authorities responsible for maritime border negotiations described the lengthy yet inconclusive dialogues they have had with neighbouring countries. In fact, several Indonesian authorities from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that these neighbouring countries are 'intentionally deploying the strategy of prolonging the border negotiation in return for grey-area status that would render illegal activities as void'.³

In frontier spaces, the state's ability to control the territory rests upon agreed settlements with other states. To control such political frontiers, military and police presence can be an effective strategy. However, more often, in these overlapping or contested waters, military presence is as important as diplomatic presence. However, in the case of Indonesia's vast waters, this is an expensive strategy. Government officials from the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries interviewed for this research revealed that annual budgets for patrol are limited.⁴

Extractive industries have become a main feature of frontier spaces globally, including in ocean frontiers. We can refer to this as the commodification frontier. In the commodification

of ocean frontiers, the ocean becomes the frontier for the integration of maritime resources into the broader constitution of marketable resources and ecosystem services (Havice & Zalik, 2018, p. 11). Commodification frontiers can be traced back to Jason Moore's (2000) 'commodity frontier' framework which focuses not only on the plunder of resources but also on the appropriation of nature for the production of commodities for exchange. The creation of jurisdictions in the ocean (both internal waters and EEZs) is an enclosure strategy to facilitate the process of marketization. In the context of Indonesia, this commodification process can be seen in three aspects: the commodification of space, resources and human labour.

Commodification of ocean spaces is driven by the state as a means to accumulate capital. For instance, Indonesian Law no. 1/2014 concerning the Management of Coastal Areas and Small Islands (known as the PWP3K Law), which amended Law no. 27/2007, has provided opportunities for foreign investment in coastal areas and small islands. In theory, these areas are common property, so the principle of exploiting coastal resources and small islands is open access. Despite this, the PWP3K Law outlines concepts for location permits and management permits, including a coastal waters utilization permit (IP-3) and a coastal water space utilization permit (IPRP-2). These permits plot how coastal areas and small islands in Indonesia are to be used, as they exploit coastal areas by allocating them to legal subjects, either individuals or legal entities.

The commodification of Indonesia's ocean resources, particularly fisheries, stems from the Indonesia being the locus of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices. The maritime areas of Indonesia's neighbours have been over-exploited, pushing many foreign ships to begin fishing in Indonesia's comparatively resource-rich territories (*ASEAN Post*, 2018). There are at least three reasons why Indonesian waters are often visited by foreign vessels. First, Indonesian waters are rich in high-quality and valuable fish species, such as tuna. Second, unresolved maritime boundary issues, such as in the North Natuna/South China Sea, allows rampant illegal fishing from neighbouring countries. Third, Indonesia's ocean is vast, making ongoing proper surveillance impossible due to the significant resources required.

Relatedly, the commodification of human labour in ocean frontiers stems from growing competitiveness in fisheries. Long-distance fishing operations are labour intensive, with workers' wages accounting for between 30% and 50% of operating costs.⁵ Using low-skilled and low-waged migrant labour means that these costs can be cut considerably (Agnew et al., 2009, p. 200). As result, the exploitation of migrant workers who work as fishing boat crews at home and abroad is an ongoing issue without resolution. Labour fishers who work for companies or shipowners frequently face low wages, exploitation, initial debt and debt bondage, making them vulnerable to human trafficking, especially during the crew recruitment process. Likewise, the wage model and working conditions on board fishing boats leads to a high risk of exploitation due to the informal recruitment system.⁶

Having discussed the theoretical framework regarding re-territorialization of ocean frontiers, the next section will further illustrate the framework through the case of Indonesia's ocean policy, focusing on the presidency of Joko Widodo.

3. INDONESIA'S EFFORTS IN OCEAN GOVERNANCE

In 1957, when it was a newly independent country, Indonesia formalized its national claim over the country's territorial waters through the Djuanda Declaration. The declaration intended to replace the Dutch-issued Territorial Sea and Maritime Districts Ordinance of 1939. The attempt to do so began in 1956, when Indonesia's territorial waters were determined to extend from 3 to 12 miles from the low-tide line of each island. The effort to demarcate Indonesian territorial waters was primarily motivated by the presence of Dutch ships in the Java Sea. This shows that the creation of frontier spaces by the Indonesian government was to remove the prior social

order created by the Dutch colonizers and replace it with an Indonesian social order, asserting control over the young nation's access and resources.

Under its first president (1945–67), Sukarno, the Indonesian government attempted to territorialize its claims by drawing a baseline to determine its territorial waters. This also acted as a political tool for the government to physically unify the Indonesian people, separated as they are by waters. This series of actions was motivated by the need for Indonesia to gain international recognition and obtain authority in regulating access to the country's maritime territory (Butcher, 2009).

From the 1960s to the 1990s, maritime affairs occupied a less significant position in Indonesia's economic sector. Under Suharto, Indonesia's authoritarian second president (1967–98), the government focused on agriculture, oil and forestry as the backbones of economic growth. The focus on agriculture, especially rice, occurred because Indonesia experienced a rice crisis in 1972. Fisheries were still on the periphery during the 1990s, growing just 5.2% per annum compared with manufacturing and oil and gas, which grew by 9.47% and 10.0%, respectively (Booth, 1994). In the 1990s, Suharto's regime continued to focus on mineral resource extraction and did not expend significant effort in exploring the country's seas as a potential frontier of economic development.

When the Suharto regime collapsed in 1998, more attention slowly began to be paid to the development of the marine sectors (Dirjen Pengelolaan Laut, 2020). A new ministry was formed, the Department of Marine Exploration, sealed by Presidential Decree no. 136/1999, although the name was quickly changed in the same year to the Department of Sea Exploration and Fisheries. In 2009, the Department became the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, and, until 2014, focused on responding to issues affecting Indonesia's coastal areas and islands. Cooperation was initiated with the private sector, civil society organizations, universities and international organizations through initiatives such as the Sea Partnership Program (*Program Kemitraan Bahari Indonesia*) which aimed to accelerate development in coastal areas and small islands. Fisher people, however, continued to struggle in the face of a declining marine sector and failed government attempts to combat IUU fishing (Tempo.co, 2014).

During the early democratic reform period (*reformasi*) of 1999–2004, Indonesia began to focus more on issues relating to maritime security and illegal practices. Indonesia's medium national development plan for that period indicated a plan to focus on tackling IUU fishing, and, during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14), the Indonesian government recognized the need to address the proliferation of foreign fishing vessels in Indonesian waters, especially those vessels committing illegal fishing.

While Yudhoyono's government began the prioritization of a marine development agenda, it was the presidency of Joko Widodo (2014–present) that made the agenda one of the top priorities of the Indonesian government. In 2017, Widodo published the first-ever official document detailing Indonesia's ocean policy. To realize his vision to position Indonesia as a global maritime fulcrum, Widodo's government has pushed several key policies that prioritize the development of Indonesia's ocean sector by the active zoning of Indonesia's seas (jurisdictional frontiers), building up its maritime diplomacy (political frontiers) and the re-enacting of neoliberal policy in fishery sector (commodification frontiers).

4. RE-TERRITORIALIZATION OF JURISDICTIONAL FRONTIERS

The first agenda initiated by the Widodo administration in realizing the vision of Indonesia becoming a maritime fulcrum is the acceleration of marine spatial planning. Since 2007, the central government has encouraged local governments to develop and enforce local regulations relating to the Zoning Plan for Coastal Areas and Small Islands (RZWP3K) as a mechanism for

managing water areas based on Law no. 27/2007. In 2015, the Widodo government further strengthened its commitment by accelerating the deliberation process to finalize the RZWP3K.

In 2016, Widodo passed Presidential Instruction no. 7 /2016 concerning the Acceleration of National Fisheries Industry Development. The instruction mandates an acceleration of the mapping of and planning for fishing grounds based on the capacity and monitoring of fish stocks. The following year, Presidential Regulation no. 16/2017 on the Maritime Policy of Indonesia made a similar call to accelerate the development of integrated marine spatial and coastal zoning plans to better manage marine resources.

In simple terms, zoning practices are territorial efforts undertaken by the state to control resources, thereby limiting and blocking people's access to resources. Once completed, documents related to marine zoning become the basis for sustainable use of coastal, marine and small island resources for the next 20 years. This zonation will enable the government to issue licences for marine resource exploitation.

In 2019, Government Regulation no. 32/2019 concerning marine spatial planning was issued. Marine spatial planning is used by the government as a legal instrument to determine access and use rights for ocean-related economic activities. Indonesia's National Planning Ministry (Bappenas) claimed that the zoning of Indonesian waters would benefit all stakeholders, and the plan was to accommodate the desires of both conservationists and fishers, with zones divided into national parks, fishing areas and ecotourism areas. Bappenas also argued that zoning would reduce production costs for fishers while at the same time sustaining fish populations. By applying sustainable fishing methods, fishers would also benefit from higher prices for their catch.

Law no. 1/2014 on Coastal and Small Island Maintenance requires every province in Indonesia to submit provincial blueprints for coastal and island spatial planning. This spatial planning process involves two steps: zoning maps of coastal areas as far as 12 nautical miles from coastlines and small islands by provincial governments (RZWP3K), and national marine spatial plans (PRLN) for marine areas covering from 12 to 200 miles. Together, the two components make up the entire EEZ of Indonesian waters and provide the basis for granting permits.

Government Regulation no. 32/2019 states, in Article 5 letter G, that 'RTRL [marine spatial plans] are guidelines for granting water location permits and water management permits in coastal areas, small islands, and at sea'. Meanwhile, in Presidential Regulation no. 18/2020 concerning the National Medium-Term Development Plan for 2020–24, there is an instruction on making the sea a new 'territory' on the national development agenda. Based on this framework, regional spatial planning becomes vital and requires immediate resolution.

Zoning and area planning also applies to marine waters, regulated through Law no. 32/2014 concerning the Marine Affairs and Government Regulation no. 32/2019 on Marine Spatial Planning. The laws divide oceanic planning areas into 38 national strategic areas (KSN), 20 interregional areas (KAW) and 25 specific national strategic areas (KSNT), all of which are under the authority of the central government, as well as 34 RZWP3K zoning plans under the authority of provincial governments. So far, 26 out of 34 provinces in Indonesia have had their blueprints finalized, and as of 24 May 2020, four more provincial blueprints were awaiting approval (darilaut.id, 2020). The Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment claims that the blueprints will resolve spatial conflicts in all provinces.⁷

Indonesia also asserts its power over its jurisdictional maritime frontiers by articulating assurance for safe passage. Being the world's largest archipelago, Indonesia lies between the Indian and Pacific oceans (Figure 1), and provides freedom to passage for trade, logistics and naval forces through three 'Sea Lanes of Communication' (*Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia* – ALKI). These sea lanes have become significantly busier in recent years, meaning Indonesia needs to ensure that economic activities for foreign vessels passing through its maritime territory occur smoothly. An historic agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore was submitted to the



Figure 1. Indonesia's territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (EEZ).

International Maritime Organization (IMO) in September 2007 to co-manage the safety of navigation and environmental protection of the Straits of Singapore and Malacca.⁸

5. RE-TERRITORIALIZATION OF POLITICAL FRONTIERS

Two broad policy agendas are pursued by Widodo's government in controlling the political frontiers of Indonesia's ocean: first, policies that strengthen Indonesia's regional and global engagement in maritime issues; and second, policies that support Indonesia's unilateral sinking of foreign IUU fishing vessels. These two agendas may appear contradictory at first, but in fact they serve the same objective: to increase Indonesia's international recognition over its political authority on maritime issues. The first agenda aims to create recognition through cooperation; and the second aims to create recognition through coercion.

In terms of regional and global engagement with maritime issues, the Widodo government pays considerable attention to IUU fishing. This is likely due to the government's objective of territorializing Indonesia's ocean frontiers. As an archipelagic country, Indonesia has sea boundaries with 10 countries, and the complexity of border problems has resulted in unfinished maritime border agreements with several of these countries, including Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

To protect Indonesia's EEZ, at the regional level Indonesia has become a leading actor in ASEAN's efforts to mainstream a discourse that frames IUU fishing as transnational crime. In our interviews with Indonesian government authorities, we find that persuading ASEAN member states to strengthen cooperation in the prevention and eradication of IUU fishing in the ASEAN region by emphasizing the principles of traceability and transparency forms part of Indonesia's efforts to establish IUU fishing as transnational crime. To do so, Indonesia has initiated several region-wide cooperation initiatives, such as (1) ASEAN Guidelines for Preventing the Entry of Fish and Fishery Products from IUU Fishing Activities into the Supply Chain; (2) ASEAN Catch Documentation Scheme; (3) Regional Fishing Vessels Record; (4) Regional Cooperation to Support the Implementation of the Port State Measures in ASEAN Region; and (5) Regional Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity.

In the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) mechanism, Indonesia has succeeded in including cooperation in fighting IUU fishing in ARF working documents on maritime security, such as the ARF Work Plan on Maritime Security 2015–17. In 2015, Indonesia also initiated the East Asia Summit (EAS) Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation, which

includes five pillars of maritime cooperation in the East Asia region. Eradicating and preventing IUU fishing represent an important part of the agreement. Cooperation over IUU fishing was discussed in the context of managing transboundary challenges and marine environments, as well as with regards to cooperation to prevent the production of fishery products generated from IUU fishing activities. When hosting the 6th ASEAN Maritime Forum Meeting and the 4th Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) in Manado in September 2015, Indonesia specifically raised the importance of overcoming the problem of IUU fishing. At this meeting, Indonesia again proposed the establishment of a regional arrangement for countering IUU fishing and invited countries in the region to support this initiative.

In addition to pushing for regional cooperation, at the global level Indonesia is actively pursuing a campaign to create a global consensus on IUU fishing as a transnational crime. The Indonesian government not only defines IUU as illegal fishing, but also as a crime that includes drug smuggling, human trafficking, and slavery. During Indonesia's 2018 Our Ocean Conference, held by the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF), Indonesia argued in front of delegates from Asian and African countries that IUU Fishing is a transnational crime and should be covered by a resolution of the United Nations (UN). Indonesia's efforts in mainstreaming IUU fishing as transnational organized crime are also carried out in forums under the framework of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Indonesia has also pushed for the inclusion of IUU fishing in various UN General Assembly resolutions relating to fisheries.

As suggested by one high ranking MMAF official interviewed for this research, Indonesia's motivation to mainstream the notion of IUU fishing is not only framed as a response toward a violation of its sovereign territorial rights but also as a regional effort to confront a form of transnational crime affecting the entire region. Indonesia's persistent efforts on this subject can be attributed to the lack of international consensus regarding IUU fishing. Many countries contend that IUU fishing is simply an administrative violation that can be solved by cooperating in the management of fisheries resources across countries (FGD 1, 2020). Indonesia views the problem as much more significant.

Indonesia's campaign has so far not strongly resonated internationally. According to other high-ranking officials from MMAF, several countries have even openly rejected Indonesia's proposals and initiatives to form binding regional instruments to eradicate IUU fishing (FGD 1, 2020). They are worried that this initiative will have a negative impact on their country's economies, especially for countries with sizeable fisheries sectors. However, Indonesia has succeeded in enacting some bilateral cooperation initiatives on eradicating IUU fishing. For instance, in 2021, Australia agreed to assist Indonesia in tracking and monitoring IUU fishing vessels passing through its waters (antaranews.com, 2021).

Indonesia's engagement in mainstreaming IUU fishing can be seen as a strategy to create regional recognition over Indonesia's concern regarding its periphery territories. Given the lack of Indonesia's resources for increasing the state infrastructural presence in its ocean frontiers, a normative acceptance over IUU fishing as a transnational crime would enable Indonesia's diplomatic infrastructure to push other countries to accept the anti-IUU fishing norm.

Indonesia has also taken assertive action against IUU fishing by sinking foreign vessels allegedly operating illegally in Indonesia's ocean territories. Together with his first-term Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, a fishery and transport entrepreneur, Widodo advanced a zero-tolerance policy towards IUU fishing. Indonesia's 'sinking vessel' policy became well known in the region: the government confiscated and, using explosive devices, selectively blew up vessels legally proven to be involved in IUU fishing. The aim was to create a deterrent effect for IUU fishing and other illegal activities in Indonesian waters, to improve fishing stocks and conserve the environment, and to improve the livelihoods of local small-scale fishers. A

national task force coordinating the national agencies with mandates to protect the Indonesian territories, called Satgas 115, was formed to enforce IUU fishing deterrent mechanisms.

In carrying out these re-territorialization efforts, the Widodo government uses a unilateral strategy to prevent neighbouring countries from entering Indonesian waters. This policy deviates from ‘the ASEAN way’, the regional approach that prioritizes consultation among ASEAN member countries. Instead, burning and sinking ships without prior notification became the dominant instrument of Widodo’s first-term government response toward IUU fishing. Based on the location and the diversity of vessels affected by the policy, Indonesia clearly wanted to send a message that any country operating in any parts of Indonesia’s territory would face serious consequences.

Between 2014 and 2019, MMAF sank a total of 516 vessels from a wide array of countries, including some from Indonesia itself (Table 1). The national composition of sunken vessels became a regional controversy that also alerted policymakers in Indonesia, resulting in questions on the wisdom of the policy as well as why so few Chinese vessels were sunk despite reports of frequent violations of these vessels in Indonesian waters. The minister was summoned by the Indonesian Parliament to speak on this matter; she declared that she supported the policy (Deny, 2016).

Despite the significance of the 2014–19 ‘sinking vessel’ policy in our FGDs, no issues were raised by officials from neighbouring countries such as Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines regarding the policy’s impact on regional cohesion.⁹ In fact, most countries affirmed Indonesia’s concern over IUU fishing. A Vietnamese official, for instance, despite being from the country with the most vessels sunk under the policy, commented that IUU fishing should be addressed by the regional institutions’ collective efforts.¹⁰ The only official reaction from the Vietnamese government came in the form of a reminder that unilateral action, such as sinking vessels without prior notification, violates the 2003–04 Continental Bilateral Agreement between Indonesia and Vietnam (Kantaprawira et al., 2018). By the end of Widodo’s first term, following increased acceptance of neighbouring countries for Indonesia’s concern on the need to address IUU fishing, the ‘sinking vessel’ policy was quietly phased out.

One curious point is the lack of sunken IUU fishing vessels originating in China, despite the growing size of China’s fishing fleet across the globe (Gutierrez & Jobbins, 2020). Our interviews with two Indonesian fishermen operating in the Indonesian western and eastern waters, as well as a government official, confirmed that the global phenomenon of encountering large Chinese

Table 1. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing vessels sunk in Indonesian waters, 2014–19.

Country of origin	Number of vessels
Vietnam	295
Philippines	91
Malaysia	76
Indonesia	26
Thailand	23
Papua New Guinea	2
China	1
Nigeria	1
Belize	1
Total	516

Source: Beritagar.id (2019).

fishing vessels (which are at least twice as large as a naval patrol boat) in other countries' territories, sometimes escorted with military boats, has also been occurring in Indonesia.¹¹ This might explain why although more than half of IUU vessels encountered come from China yet so few are sunk. In addition, Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries have a geopolitical issue in the North Natuna/South China Sea, where IUU fishing collides with China's Nine-Dash Line claim over the region. This appears to have affected how the Indonesian government treated Chinese vessels violating laws by entering Indonesia's EEZ waters. Indonesia prioritized diplomatic processes, such as sending letters of protest to the Chinese government on the intrusion of Chinese ships in its EEZ, to avoid escalating conflict and complicating ongoing diplomatic efforts on the matter (Nirmala et al., 2020). Another possibility is the informal agreement between Indonesia and China not to make the number of sunken vessels public due to the eagerness of both countries to settle this issue amicably as way to reduce anti-China sentiment in Indonesia.

In addition to the 'sunken vessels' policy, Widodo's administration has implemented several additional disincentive measures such as fines and expropriation. However, the mechanism to impose hefty fines on perpetrators of IUU fishing is insufficient. The aim is to regain the losses of potential state income as a result of illegal fishing activities, but even though the size of the fine has increased several times, most perpetrators reportedly choose jail time instead of paying fines. Worse, the Indonesian government is unable to punish the primary owners of vessels caught fishing in Indonesia's EEZ, because in order to do so Indonesia must have a bilateral fishing agreement with the country from which the vessels originate. This means that to force them to pay fines, Indonesia must resort to diplomatic efforts, so in the meantime, the perpetrators are not allowed to leave Indonesia. The longer they are detained in Indonesia, the higher the cost to the Indonesian government. Meanwhile, expropriation is not as simple as handing over the fishing tools and vessels to another party in Indonesia. Since most of the vessels would be auctioned off for less than market price, the original owner of the vessels often use a third party to join the auction and regain the vessel, despite the risks they run if identified (Liliansa, 2020). Nevertheless, these disincentives signal Indonesia's continued assertiveness on ending IUU fishing and create a deterrent effect for foreign vessels from entering Indonesia's waters, especially those involved in illegal fishing.

6. RE-TERRITORIALIZATION OF COMMODIFICATION FRONTIERS

The above discussion shows how in the first period of his presidency, Widodo implemented a maritime agenda that was dominated by the need for Indonesia to establish its presence in both the jurisdictional and political frontiers. During Widodo's second term, however, the government launched a reorientation of its marine policies using a combination of 'development' and 'conservation' themes. Policies became focused on attracting investment in marine infrastructure development, particularly ports, mining and reclamation projects, while at the same time rhetorically advocating for marine conservation, including facilitating the development of the tourism industry. This is reflected in a statement Widodo made in 2017:

'Our oceans must become the centre of economic development through investment in marine infrastructure, marine-based economic activities, integration and security of marine transportation networks, and sustainable use of marine resources' (Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, 2017).

In 2020, shortly after Widodo's second term began, the government issued a Law no. 11/2020 on Job Creation referred to as the Omnibus Law. This was done as an effort to liberalize regulations in various economic sectors, including the maritime sector. The main objectives behind the Omnibus Law were to simplify licensing rules and procedures for businesses and

to liberalize sectors in order to attract foreign investment. However, the unintended consequences of this policy may include large-scale exploitation of Indonesia's fisheries resources by foreign parties, as previously happened between 2000 and 2014. The formulation of Article 27 point 10 of the Omnibus Law maintains that Indonesia's EEZ is open for foreign vessels to access EEZ areas for fishing. In addition, Article 27 point 15 eliminates the obligation to use Indonesian national crew members on foreign-flagged fishing vessels operating in Indonesia. By eliminating this obligation, it is possible for foreign fishing vessels operating in Indonesia to use 100% foreign crews.

The tendency for the Indonesian government to treat fishery labour as a commodity can be seen in the lack of political will from the government in strengthening fishery labour governance. This is because the government still sees Indonesian labour as a commodity integral to the development of Indonesia's maritime industry. In 2020, when major fishing vessel slavery cases came to light, a source from MMAF said that his ministry made three recommendations to the government: (1) accelerate the process of harmonizing government regulations for the protection of commercial boat crews and fishing boat crews; (2) implement a moratorium on sending fishing boat crews abroad; (3) and encourage ratification of 2007 ILO Convention 188 on Work in Fishing (known as C188).¹² Only the first recommendation has been followed up on, although progress has been slow. A draft regulation to clarify the agency responsible for overseeing Indonesian migrant workers in the fisheries sector has not yet been signed by the president, and there are no indications as to when this will occur. The recommendations for a moratorium on sending fishing boat crews abroad and the ratification of C188 have not been implemented.

Most of the government officials interviewed for this research attribute slavery incidents involving Indonesian migrant workers to a lack of proper training of crew members.¹³ One interviewee argued that, generally, crew members who experience human rights violations do not have the basic competencies needed to work on fishing boats. For example, they are not equipped with basic safety training nor relevant technical expertise. Since 2017, despite MMAF's declaration of its commitment to improving the protection of fishing crews in the country, Indonesia does not have a minimum wage for the fishery sector nor has the country provided improved training facilities for fishing crews.

Higher income is one of the main reasons motivating Indonesian fishing crews to work on foreign vessels. Many are promised high salaries, although in practice this is often not followed through. Consequently, MMAF has tried to protect the rights of fishing boat crews by stipulating that the standard salary for fishing boat crews working on foreign fishing vessels should be twice the Indonesian minimum salary. This is regulated in MMAF Regulation no. 42/2016 concerning the Sea Work Agreement for Fishing Boat Crew. However, there is no law in place to enforce this ministerial regulation, rendering it essentially useless.

The Indonesian government's tendency to treat Indonesian fishery workers as a commodity is therefore linked to its resistance to ratify ILO C188. Resistance is particularly strong from the Ministry of Manpower. Despite the pressure for the Indonesian government to ratify C188, no concrete steps to do so have been taken. As confirmed from our interviews and focus group discussions, officials from Indonesia's Ministry of Manpower argue that such ratification is not urgent for Indonesia, because C188 would not necessarily protect Indonesian seafarers working on foreign vessels.¹⁴

The more logical explanation behind the lack of ratification is that the Ministry of Manpower wants to be careful and avoid negatively impacting the business climate in Indonesia. The Ministry of Manpower has said that it has consulted workers' unions and employers' associations, and found that while workers want to see C188 ratified, employers are still reluctant. The reason why employers are less supportive is the domestic placement system implemented in Indonesia, which usually emphasizes a profit-sharing mechanism without any stipulation of rules regarding minimum wage. Given the prevalence of such a system, should ILO C188 be implemented without

taking existing practices into account, both employers and the Ministry of Manpower are concerned it will weaken the competitiveness of Indonesia's fisheries businesses.

Other than commodification of labour, Widodo's second-term government has engaged in the prompt commodification of Indonesia's ocean resources by emphasizing the importance of revitalizing the maritime industry. Since the enactment of MMAF Regulation no. 56/2014 concerning the Temporary Cessation (Moratorium) of Capture Fisheries Business Licensing in the State Fisheries Management Area of the Republic of Indonesia, which particularly impacts foreigners, more than 50% of fishing companies in the Philippines have gone bankrupt, especially in General Santos.¹⁵

However, such restrictions on capture fisheries business licensing for foreigners have not advanced Indonesia's own fishing industry. This is because, in the regional value chain, Indonesia is merely a supporting industry for the fish processing industry sector, centralized in the Philippines and Thailand. It is thus not surprising that the practice of exporting higher quality fish to the Philippines and selling substandard tuna within Indonesia has become a common practice. Although the purpose of the moratorium was to assist Indonesia to organize its internal seas and reduce IUU fishing, it did not revitalize the local fish canning industry. According to one interviewee from Indonesia's tuna association,¹⁶ this stems from the lack of profit incentives for fisheries entrepreneurs to sell captured tuna to the domestic canning industry. In addition, for large fishing entrepreneurs with vessels of more than 2000 GT, their primary concern was the government requirement for them to build a domestic processing industry, which they think is not profitable. This resulted in capture fisheries entrepreneurs failing to report their actual catch tonnage figures.

In addition, during Widodo's first term, the Minister for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries issued a regulation prohibiting permits for new ships measuring over 150 GT. The spirit of this prohibition was to protect Indonesian seas from being overfished, so that traditional fishermen can also improve their livelihoods. However, this moratorium, according to fishery entrepreneurs, ended up essentially suffocating the Indonesian industry. Many areas of Indonesia's oceans experience large waves requiring ships beyond 150 GT; consequently, the competing foreign vessels in the high seas are beyond 150 GT, resulting in the Indonesian fisheries sector losing out.

One interviewee from the tuna business association explained:

This policy is ridiculous. ... The biggest wooden boats that dominate Indonesia's fishery industry today are all definitely under 200 GT ... if we compare it to other countries such as Spain, they have ships bigger than 4000 GT that catch tuna and skipjack. So, if we want to compete on the high seas with such size restrictions, we are actually limiting our steps to grow in the EEZ and international waters. Not to mention that Indonesia's domestic fishery sector is mainly dominated by big fisheries entrepreneurs. As a result of such restriction, those big players tend to catch fish in fishery grounds that only need regional permits by just reducing their ship tonnage. This has affected small fisherman that must compete with big business.¹⁷

Not surprisingly, then, both unpopular policies were overturned during Widodo's second term. The requirement for large fishing entrepreneurs to build domestic processing industry was removed, and licenses began to be reissued to fishing vessels with over 150 GT capacity to operate in the EEZ. This was done to incentivize big local players to fish in Indonesia's EEZ. Although foreign vessels remain unable to enter Indonesia's EEZ, however, trawlers are now permitted to operate once more, as long as the vessel receives discretionary approval from the Minister of Fisheries Affairs (according to Regulation of Minister of Fishery no. 18/2018). Moreover, in March 2022, there is now a plan to organize a Marine and Fisheries Business and Investment Forum to promote this measured-capture fishery model. The Arafura Sea (Fisheries Management Area

718) will be the area to implement this model, with numerous items to be regulated for ensuring sustainable fishing, including quotas, zoning, docking of vessels, fuel, equipment for fishing, and transportation services. The government has also reallocated ex-foreign fishing vessels to operate in Indonesian Fisheries Management Areas, under a requirement to share 50% of unused sustainable fishing quota with ex-foreign fishing vessels.¹⁸ For the Indonesia government, this is a sensible move, given that the quota size is the same as for local fishers with small vessels under 30 GT.¹⁹ This is evidence that Widodo's second-term administration is driven largely by the growth of state power to support capitalist exploitation of the sea, with income generation from capture fisheries seemingly an underlying motive.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The study of land frontiers in Indonesia has shown that state territorialization through land acquisition and dispossession to create access to resources has increased the domination of state involvement in regulating the country's frontiers. We find similar patterns in the case of state territorialization of ocean frontiers in Indonesia. However, the process of state territorialization – or more accurately, re-territorialization – of ocean frontiers is further complicated by the contested nature of maritime areas, as there is a high level of involvement from other state actors. This has pushed Indonesia to reorient its foreign policy to support the re-territorialization of its oceans.

Our analysis of Indonesia's ocean policy allows us to conceptualize the process of oceanic territorialization as a way of governing three frontiers: jurisdiction frontiers, political frontiers, and commodification frontiers. Through the case of Indonesia, our article contributes to the study of ocean frontiers by identifying several challenges faced by archipelagic countries. Sharing ocean frontiers with multiple countries, possessing rich fishing grounds, and lying in the cross-ocean routes where foreign vessels deserve safe and peaceful passage, requires that Indonesia continues to adapt its ocean policies to the shifting inter-country dynamics of the region as a way to re-territorialize its ocean frontiers. Geopolitical tensions in the region, especially in the Natuna/South China Sea, also affect how Indonesia builds cooperation with neighbouring countries while also pressuring those who fail to prevent and combat IUU fishing.

Our findings provide several insights regarding Indonesia's ocean policy as well as the study of ocean frontiers in general. First, the seemingly contradictory approaches in Indonesia's ocean policy during the first and second Widodo administrations should not be seen as inconsistencies in government objectives, as has been argued by some observers. Rather, Widodo's second-term policies are a continuation of his first-term efforts to strengthen Indonesia's governance of its ocean frontiers. It is thus clear that economic development underpins the agendas of Joko Widodo's ocean policy.

Second, although our conceptualization is primarily driven by the case of Indonesia, the three oceanic frontiers – jurisdiction, political, and commodification – are not uniquely Indonesian. Our analysis provides useful insights for other countries from the Global South struggling for the same (re-)territorialization. The Philippines, for instance, is implementing a blue economy policy as a re-territorialization effort to capture market potential, understanding that the territorialization process is important in securing food security (Satizábal et al., 2020). Differences in the ways archipelagic countries frame their territorialization processes could provide further interesting insights into the study of ocean frontiers. Furthermore, to what extent such (re-)territorialization results in archipelagic countries' abilities to accumulate resources and pursue marine-based industrialization in the capture fisheries sector would provide a research venue for future territorialization and developmental studies.

Our conceptualization, however, is not without limitation. The analysis does not pay much attention to contestation happening within the state. It has been studied elsewhere that

competing authorities, coupled with the lack of enforcement capacity, is the main factor contributing to the weakness of maritime Southeast Asian states in controlling ocean space (Williams, 2013). In the case of Indonesia, the existence of competing agencies stems from the fragmentation of the state in the post-authoritarian period due to growing patronage distribution as well as the broader neoliberal model of economic, social, and cultural life (Karim, 2017). Our analysis, thus, points toward the need for further research into the political economy regarding domestic struggles affecting the territorialization of Indonesia's ocean frontiers.

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NOTES

1. Initially named the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Resources when established in 2014.
2. Presidential Decree no. 16 of 2017 concerning Indonesian Maritime Policy.
3. Informants 16 (3 August 2020) and 18 (6 August 2020).
4. Informant 12 (29 July 2020).
5. Informants 7 and 8 (14 July 2020).
6. Informant 7 and 8 (14 July 2020).
7. Informant 8 (26 October 2020).
8. Document of 'The Cooperative Mechanism between the Littoral States and User States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore'; <https://www.mpa.gov.sg/web/wcm/connect/www/d87fcd3c-0b64-4f72-a3d9-dfeebd612412/spore-mtg-co-op-mechan-070904.pdf?MOD=AJPERES/>.
9. Informants 20–22 (24 February 2021).
10. Informant 22 (24 February 2021).
11. Informants 3 (7 July 2020), 4 (8 July 2020) and 16 (3 August 2020).
12. Informant 6 (15 July 2020).
13. Informants 6 (15 July 2020), 10 (21 July 2020) and 16 (3 August 2020).
14. Informants 7 and 8 (14 July 2020).
15. Informant 5 (14 July 2020).
16. Informant 19 (13 August 2020).
17. Informant 19 (13 August 2020).
18. See Government Regulation no. 27/2021 as part of the Omnibus Law.
19. Informant 11 (13 August 2020).

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